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THE UNCHARTED WATERS OF COMPETITION AND 
INNOVATION IN BIOLOGICAL MEDICINES 
ERIKA LIETZAN* 
ABSTRACT 
 In 2010, Congress fundamentally changed how federal law encourages the discovery 
and development of certain new medicines and for the first time authorized less expensive 
“duplicates” of these medicines to be approved and compete in the marketplace. The medi-
cines at issue are biological medicines—generally, medicines made from, or grown in, living 
systems. Many of the world’s most important and most expensive medicines for serious and 
life-threatening diseases are biological medicines. Today, that law is beginning to bear fruit; 
FDA has begun to approve the first of these duplicates, called “biosimilars,” and the prod-
ucts have begun to enter the marketplace. 
 We have a profound interest in understanding and evaluating the impact of this legisla-
tion on innovation and competition in medicine. Scholars and courts considering this ques-
tion may be tempted to reason from, or analogize to, experience with generic drugs. The ge-
neric drug statute, which applies to ordinary drugs, most of which are small and chemically 
synthesized, is thirty years old. It has yielded a rich field of scholarship and jurisprudence 
relating to innovation and competition. The 2010 biosimilar law was similar to the 1984 
generic drug statute in basic purpose and structure. But the biologic framework as a 
whole—the complete landscape within which innovation and competition in biological med-
icines take place—is profoundly different from anything that scholars and courts have seen 
before. We are in uncharted waters. 
 This Article is the first piece of legal scholarship to offer a high-level map to those wa-
ters, organized around the characteristics that define the biologic framework and distin-
guish it from the thirty-year-old conventional drug framework. It makes two claims. First, 
the pathway to market, the competitive landscape, and the means and extent of market pen-
etration for biosimilars are likely to vary from product to product and maybe even from 
company to company. They are also likely to evolve over time. The variability and dynamic 
nature of the biosimilar pathway and market penetration distinguish the biologic frame-
work from the drug framework. Second, biologic patents have been severed from the regula-
tory paradigm. Patents are more clearly distinguished, in purpose and function, from the 
primary regulatory device designed to reward preclinical and clinical research—data exclu-
sivity. The regulatory scheme does not reinforce biologic innovator patents the way the drug 
regulatory scheme reinforces drug patents. And, although the biologic framework makes 
premarket patent litigation possible, it omits the regulatory incentives to achieving pre-
market resolution of patent disputes that have been a hallmark of the drug scheme for more 
than thirty years. 
 Although scholars and policymakers focusing on innovation and competition with re-
spect to medicine have decades of experience with the generic drug paradigm, this experience 
may be mostly irrelevant when it comes to biologics. The specific differences between the two 
frameworks, and the broader thematic divergence at play in the biologic framework, have 
profound implications for analysis of the marketplace. This Article fills a needed gap, by 
providing a basis for understanding how fundamentally the biologics framework differs 
and, in the final Section, precisely how these differences may matter. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 After a tornado lifts, spins, and drops her Kansas farm-house, 
Dorothy Gale steps out, holding her terrier, and steps slowly and 
wide-eyed through a fantastical new landscape: large, vividly colored 
plants, low white buildings with tiny windows and thatched roofs, 
and brightly dressed munchkins hiding amongst the flowers. “Toto,” 
she says, “I’ve a feeling we’re not in Kansas anymore.” This line from 
the 1939 movie adaptation of The Wizard of Oz has become part of 
our social lexicon, used to refer to new situations that are deeply un-
familiar and potentially outside our scope of understanding.1 In 1984, 
Congress enacted a statute permitting approval of generic copies of 
innovative drugs. Twenty-six years later, it enacted a statute permit-
ting licensure of biosimilar versions of innovative biological medi-
cines, and, simply put, we’re not in Kansas anymore.2 
 Although the two medicine approval statutes are similar in basic 
design and goal, the biologic framework as a whole—the complete 
landscape within which innovation and competition in biological 
medicines will now take place—is profoundly different from anything 
that scholars and courts have seen before. We are, to offer another 
metaphor, in uncharted waters. This Article provides a map of those 
                                                                                                                  
 1. @JeremiahBullfrog, We’re Not in Kansas Anymore, URBAN DICTIONARY (Dec. 2, 2008), 
http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=we%27re+not+in+Kansas+anymore&defid=3
518170 [https://perma.cc/N93G-42LU]; see THE WIZARD OF OZ (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1939). 
 2. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 
(2010).  
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waters, organized around the characteristics that define and  
distinguish the new biologic framework from the conventional drug 
framework. 
 Understanding the defining characteristics of the biologic frame-
work is both important and urgent. The enactment of a pathway for 
approval of biosimilar applications—which rely on an innovator’s re-
search and which propose products that may infringe the innovator’s 
patents—effects a fundamental change in the regulatory, intellectual 
property, and competitive landscape for biological medicines. Society 
has a profound interest in monitoring the impact of this sea change 
on the pace, and nature, of innovation in biological medicines. We 
also have a profound interest in monitoring behavior in the resulting 
marketplace, particularly whether meaningful biosimilar competition 
emerges and benefits consumers, and whether firms act in manners 
consistent with the norms of fair competition. In short, we need to 
know that this radically new landscape both stimulates innovation 
and ensures timely and fair competition in biological medicines. 
 In the decades since enactment of the generic drug statute, a rich 
academic literature has developed regarding competition and innova-
tion in the drug framework. Although scholars have begun work on 
regulatory and intellectual property issues relating to biosimilars, 
this is the first piece of scholarship to offer a broad vision of the new 
biologic framework organized around its defining characteristics.3 
This Article comes at a crucial time, because the Food and Drug Ad-
ministration (FDA) has begun to license biosimilars.4 Nearly a dozen 
applications were pending in the first quarter of 2016, and in the 
                                                                                                                  
 3. While this Article is the first of its kind, descriptive scholarship considering the 
legislation as a whole does exist. See Anna B. Laakmann, The Hatch-Waxman Act’s Side 
Effects: Precautions for Biosimilars, 47 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 917, 920, 941 (2014) (arguing that 
the unintended side effects of the generic drug scheme—such as “convoluted products lia-
bility rules” and the propagation of “patents of questionable value”—should serve as “pre-
cautionary guideposts” for implementation of the biosimilar statute); Jordan Paradise, The 
Devil is in the Details: Health-Care Reform, Biosimilars, and Implementation Challenges 
for the Food and Drug Administration, 51 JURIMETRICS J. 279 (2011) (providing an over-
view of the new statute and FDA’s implementation then to date); Matthew J. Seamon, 
Antitrust and the Biopharmaceutical Industry: Lessons from Hatch-Waxman and an Early 
Evaluation of the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, 34 NOVA L. REV. 
629 (2010) (summarizing the legislation, noting its importance to the healthcare finance 
system, and listing concerns about antitrust compliance in the generic drug marketplace). 
 4. By October 2016, FDA had licensed four biosimilars: Zarxio® (filgrastim-sndz), 
Inflectra® (infliximab-dyyb), Erelzi® (etanercept-szzs), and Amjevita® (adalimumab-atto); 
these referenced Neupogen® (filgrastim), Remicade® (infliximab), Enbrel® (etancerpt), 
and Humira® (adalimumab), respectively. See FDA, LIST OF LICENSED BIOLOGICAL 
PRODUCTS WITH (1) REFERENCE PRODUCT EXCLUSIVITY AND (2) BIOSIMILARITY OR 
INTERCHANGEABILITY EVALUATIONS TO DATE (2017), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/ 
Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved/ApprovalApplicati
ons/TherapeuticBiologicApplications/Biosimilars/UCM560162.pdf [https://perma.cc/9K37-72RD]. 
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third quarter FDA reported 66 biosimilar products in development, 
pertaining to 20 innovative products.5 Various patent disputes relat-
ing to pending or planned biosimilar applications are underway or 
have concluded, at the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) or in the 
federal courts.6 Thus, although the scheme was perceived as slow to 
launch, the next few years could bring a sizeable number of biosimi-
lar market entrants.7 
 Development of a rich academic discourse around innovation and 
competition in biological medicines will require understanding the 
broader framework within which that innovation and competition oc-
cur and the ways in which it differs from the familiar drug framework. 
 This Article claims that the biologic framework differs in two es-
sential ways. First, unlike the drug framework, the biologic frame-
work is variable and dynamic. That is, the rules and considerations 
relevant to biosimilar premarket licensure and market penetration 
may vary by product class and, perhaps, also by product and by ap-
plicant. Further, these rules and considerations are developing in 
parallel with licensure of the first products and are likely to evolve as 
the agency and industry gain comfort with the scheme and as the sci-
ence matures. The framework is therefore dynamic. Scholars and 
courts will be considering innovation and competition within a 
framework that is idiosyncratic and evolving. Second, the biologic 
framework separates patents, functionally and conceptually, from the 
regulatory paradigm. To begin with, the primary regulatory mecha-
                                                                                                                  
 5. Zachary Brennan, FDA’s Biosimilars Workload: 57 Development Programs,  
$81M Spent in First Three Fiscal Years, REG. AFFS. PROF. SOC’Y (Mar. 14, 2016), 
http://raps.org/Regulatory-Focus/News/2016/03/14/24531/FDA%E2%80%99s-Biosimilars-
Workload-57-Development-Programs-81M-Spent-in-First-Three-Fiscal-Years/ [https://perma.cc/ 
8AFT-8BEJ?type=image]; Michael Mezher, FDA Officials Share Best Practices for Biosimi-
lar Development, REG. AFFS. PROF. SOC’Y (Oct. 28, 2016), http://www.raps.org/Regulatory-
Focus/News/2016/10/28/26093/FDA-Officials-Share-Best-Practices-for-Biosimilar-Development/ 
[https://perma.cc/8XBK-6TM2]. 
 6. E.g., Amgen Inc. v. Apotex Inc., Case No. 15-61631-CIV (S.D. Fla.) (Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law) (Sept. 6, 2016) (finding that Apotex’s biosimilar applications 
for filgrastim and pegfilgrastim do not infringe U.S. Patent No. 8,952,138, which covers a 
process of protein refolding); Boehringer Ingelheim v. Genentech, Inc., No. IPR2015-00417 
(P.T.A.B. July 14, 2015) (relating to U.S. Patent No. 7,976,838, which claims a method of 
treating rheumatoid arthritis by administering an anti-CD20 antibody, namely, rituximab) 
(settled). 
 7. The Director of FDA’s Center for Drug Evaluation and Research recently warned 
that the agency’s biosimilar program may soon “explode.” Sue Sutter, Biosimilar User Fee 
Agreement Offers FDA Funding Boost, Fee Structure Overhaul, PINK SHEET (Sept.  
16, 2016), https://pink.pharmamedtechbi.com/PS119151/Biosimilar-User-Fee-Agreement-
Offers-FDA-Funding-Boost-Fee-Structure-Overhaul [https://perma.cc/MD3W-MSZR]. Not 
everyone agrees. E.g., Jason Kanter & Robin Feldman, Understanding and Incentivizing 
Biosimilars, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 57, 61 (2012) (“[C]ompanies are more likely to focus on the 
development of so-called biodifferents and biobetters (new drugs designed to mimic an 
existing biological drug), completely forgoing the opportunity to develop biosimilars.”). 
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nism for incentivizing innovative behavior—data exclusivity—is 
more clearly realized as having a purpose and function different from 
that of patents. Data exclusivity refers to the period of time before 
abbreviated applications may be submitted or approved; in the bio-
logic framework, it serves as an incentive for developing new prod-
ucts—that is, for undertaking the safety and effectiveness research 
necessary for approval of full marketing applications. While novelty 
informs data exclusivity for drugs, for biologics the inquiry into nov-
elty has been subordinated and mostly relegated to the patent 
sphere. The task of incentivizing post-approval innovation in biolog-
ics has been shifted to the patent system. Patents, in turn, have been 
lifted out of the regulatory framework; that is, they lack the regulato-
ry significance in the biologic framework that they have in the drug 
framework. 
 These differences from the familiar drug paradigm are profound, 
and their potential significance for innovation and competition 
should not be under-estimated. 
 To support these claims, this Article proceeds as follows. Part I 
describes the shared design and goals of the generic drug and biosim-
ilar biologic statutes. It also explains the scientific considerations rel-
evant to biological medicines and the historical context for enactment 
of the biosimilar statute, which account for some of its defining char-
acteristics. Part II describes the variability and dynamism of the bio-
logic framework. Section II.A argues that the path to market for bio-
similar biologics resembles an innovator’s path to market much more 
than a generic drug applicant’s path to market, but notes that the 
path will vary even now and could become more like the generic path 
over time. Section II.B argues that the marketplace after biosimilar 
launch may be utterly unlike the generic marketplace, with different 
decision-makers driving market penetration and a fair amount of un-
certainty today about the factors that will be dispositive. The mar-
ketplace combines an apparent need for branding and promotion 
with the reality of products that may not differ meaningfully in fea-
tures or labeling. Part III argues that the biologic scheme effects 
more conceptual and functional separation—than the drug scheme—
between patents, on the one hand, and data exclusivity and the regu-
latory paradigm, on the other hand. Part IV turns briefly to why all 
of this matters: the possibility that these differences could have a 
profound effect on the nature and pace of innovation, on the pace of 
biosimilar development and launch, and on the ways in which firms 
compete (or fail to compete) in the marketplace. The conclusion is 
speculative; the actual implications of this sea change in the law of 
biological medicines remain to be seen and evaluated in the years 
ahead. The aim of this Article is to serve as a useful framing device 
for that work. 
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II.   CONTEXTUALIZING THE BIOSIMILAR STATUTE 
 For more than a hundred years, the United States has separated 
its regulation of medicines into parallel but separate tracks. FDA ap-
proves non-biological drugs under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cos-
metic Act (FDCA) and licenses most biologics under the Public 
Health Service Act (PHSA).8 
 At a high level, the two statutes take similar approaches to the 
approval of medicine and aim to further the same basic goals. An in-
novator will develop a new medicine, establishing its safety and effec-
tiveness for specified medical uses (known as its “indications”) and 
under specified conditions, through a multi-year process of analytical, 
preclinical, and clinical testing.9 FDA will approve the resulting new 
drug application (NDA) or biologics license application (BLA) when it 
finds the proposed product safe and effective, applying roughly the 
same standard to each.10 The approved product may be associated 
with a period of data exclusivity. During this time, “abbreviated” ap-
plications—for a proposed duplicate or variation of the innovator’s 
product, known as its “reference” product—may not be submitted to, 
or approved by, FDA, depending on the provision at issue.11 
 An abbreviated application does not contain data demonstrating 
the safety and effectiveness of the follow-on product in question; in-
stead it makes a comparative showing sufficient to establish a bridge 
to the research submitted by the innovator.12 FDA, when it considers 
the abbreviated application, relies on the comparative showing, the 
fact that it approved the reference product, and (indirectly) the re-
search performed by the innovator.13 The agency approves the follow-
on product for some or all of the indications (medical uses), routes of 
administration (e.g., oral or injectable), dosage forms (e.g., capsule or 
                                                                                                                  
 8. FDA approves non-biological drugs under section 505 of the FDCA. 21 U.S.C. § 
355 (2012). It licenses biological products under section 351 of the PHSA. 42 U.S.C. § 262 
(2012). A handful of proteins currently approved under the FDCA satisfy the definition of 
“biological product.” Their approved drug applications under the FDCA will be converted to 
approved biologic applications under the PHSA in 2020. Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148 § 7002(e)(2), 124 Stat. 119, 817. 
 9. See generally Erika Lietzan, The Myths of Data Exclusivity, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. 
REV. 91, 96-101 (2016) (discussing research and development process). 
 10. The drug statute requires that a new drug be shown safe and effective, and it re-
quires “substantial evidence” of effectiveness. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2012). The biologic stat-
ute requires that a biological product be shown safe, pure, and potent. 42 U.S.C.  
§ 262(a)(2)(C) (2012). FDA interprets the biologic provision as requiring substantial evi-
dence of effectiveness, but it interprets “substantial evidence” more flexibly for biologics 
than for drugs. 37 Fed. Reg. 16679 (Aug. 18, 1972). 
 11. FDCA §§ 505(c)(3)(E)(ii)-(iv), (j)(5)(F)(ii)-(iv) (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7) (2012); 
see Lietzan, supra note 9, at 134-61 (describing exclusivity). 
 12. See Lietzan, supra note 9, at 110-21. 
 13. Id. at 104-05. 
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tablet), and strengths (e.g., 20 mg or 40 mg) of the reference prod-
uct.14 In the case of a drug, FDA can also approve variations or 
changes proposed by the applicant.15 
 The drug statute and biologic statute, and related provisions of 
the Patent Act, also make it possible for the innovator and follow-on 
applicant to at least start, if not fully resolve, questions of patent in-
fringement before approval, or perhaps market launch, of the follow-
on product.16 
 For a variety of reasons—including the cost-savings achieved 
through preparation of an abbreviated application—follow-on prod-
ucts may be less expensive for payers, and perhaps also patients, 
than their reference products. This allows the overall framework to 
achieve a key goal: cost-savings for the healthcare finance system, 
once the innovator has had an opportunity to recoup its investment 
in research and development of the product in the first instance (as 
well as, perhaps, failed compounds) and to earn a profit sufficient to 
motivate continued research. These cost-savings can be achieved 
through direct replacement of higher-priced innovator products with 
lower-priced duplicates at the point of sale. They can also be achieved 
through competition for consumers in the marketplace. 
 Despite their common design and goals, the generic drug frame-
work and biosimilar biologic framework are in fact fundamentally 
different. There are undoubtedly many explanations for the differ-
ences discussed in Part II of this Article. But two threshold observa-
tions seem particularly salient. 
 First, as a scientific matter, medicines placed in the “biological 
product” category differ from medicines regulated as non-biological 
“drugs.” For FDA regulatory purposes, a “biological product” is a vi-
rus, therapeutic serum, antitoxin, vaccine, protein, or analogous 
product applicable to prevention, treatment, or cure of a disease or 
condition in humans.17 The category includes Epogen® (epoetin al-
pha) (approved for treatment of anemia due to chronic kidney disease 
or chemotherapy) and Avastin® (bevacizumab) (approved for treat-
ment of various cancers). Both are complex proteins manufactured 
using biotechnology. The first is a man-made version of a hormone 
that is ordinarily secreted by the kidneys and that stimulates red cell 
production. The second is a monoclonal antibody, a type of protein 
that has no equivalent in the human body and that binds to a specific 
                                                                                                                  
 14. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2) (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(2) (2012). 
 15. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2). 
 16. Id. §§ 355(b)(2)-(3), (c)(3), (j)(2)(A)(vii), (j)(2)(B), (j)(5)(B); 42 U.S.C. § 262(l) (2012); 
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) (2012). 
 17. 42 U.S.C. § 262(i) (2012). 
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substance in the body, usually a protein on the surface of cells. The 
term “biological product” also includes vaccines, such as Gardisil® 
(human papilloma virus quadrivalent) (approved for prevention of 
various cancers), as well as blood products, gene therapy products, 
and various cell and tissue based products. Medicines that are not 
placed in the biological product category would include Prozac® 
(fluoxetine) (approved for treatment of major depressive disorder) 
and Lipitor® (atorvastatin) (approved to reduce the risk of myocardi-
al infarction and stroke in patients with various risk factors). These 
are conventional chemically synthesized small molecules. They satis-
fy the more basic definition of “drug” in the FDCA: any article in-
tended for diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of 
disease.18 Biological medicines also satisfy that basic definition, but 
they are first and foremost biologics.19 
 In colloquial terms, the common and distinguishing feature of bio-
logics is that they are often manufactured in, composed of, or derived 
from, living systems. Biological drugs are usually much larger at the 
molecular level than non-biological drugs.20 They are also structural-
ly more complex and sometimes not fully characterized in the labora-
tory.21 In some cases, the relationship between a biological product’s 
                                                                                                                  
 18. 21 U.S.C. § 321(g) (2012).  
 19. A biological medicine is subject to the “biological product” provisions of the PHSA 
(which mainly relate to premarket licensure) and all of the “drug” provisions of the FDCA 
(unless an exemption, such as the exemption from the NDA requirement, applies). In some 
cases, depending on what it is and how it works, a biological product could be a device in-
stead of a drug. See id. § 321(h) (definition of device). 
 20. Proteins can be 100 to 1,000 times larger than chemically synthesized molecules. 
H. Schellekens & James Bausch, Biopharmaceutical Molecules Are Not Created Equally, 
268 PHARM. J. 300 (2002). Acetaminophen, for example, has a molecular weight of 151 
Daltons, while erythropoietin alpha has a molecular weight of 30,400 Daltons. Simon D. 
Roger, Biosimilars: How Similar or Dissimilar Are They?, 11 NEPHROLOGY 341, 342 (2006). 
 21. Janet Woodcock et al., The FDA’s Assessment of Follow-On Protein Products: A 
Historical Perspective, 6 NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 437, 438 (June 2007) (“[P]rotein 
products are typically much larger, more complex molecules than non-protein, small mole-
cule-drugs and generally cannot be fully characterized using available analytical tech-
niques.”). Dr. Woodcock was the director of FDA’s Center for Drug Evaluation and Re-
search when she authored this piece. Full description of a complex protein typically re-
quires knowledge of its primary structure (linear amino acid sequence linked by peptide 
bonds), secondary structure (local folding of the amino acid chain into α–helices, β–pleated 
sheets, and random coil areas, maintained by hydrogen bonds), tertiary structure (folding 
of secondary structure into three-dimensional structure, including the formation of disul-
fide and hydrogen bonds between amino acids), and (when present) quaternary structure 
(association of multiple subunits of a protein or aggregation of individual proteins). See 
generally FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, QUALITY CONSIDERATIONS IN DEMONSTRATING 
BIOSIMILARITY OF A THERAPEUTIC PROTEIN PRODUCT TO A REFERENCE PRODUCT (Apr. 2015) 
[hereinafter FDA QUALITY CONSIDERATIONS GUIDANCE]; see also S.C. Reingold et al., The 
Challenge of Follow-On Biologics for Treatment of Multiple Sclerosis, 73 NEUROLOGY 552 
(Aug. 2009); Daan J.A. Crommelin et al., Shifting Paradigms: Biopharmaceuticals Versus 
Low Molecular Weight Drugs, 266 INT’L J. PHARMACEUTICS 3 (2003).  
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structural attributes and its clinical performance may not be fully 
understood.22 In some cases, its mechanisms of action may not be ful-
ly understood.23 As a result of these differences between biologics and 
other drugs, although the approval standards and data requirements 
for innovative medicines are generally harmonized as a formal mat-
ter, the scientific considerations can differ considerably.24 
 One of the most significant attributes of biological products is 
their ability to stimulate an immune response in the body. Although 
some non-biological drugs can be immunogenic, and although some 
biological medicines (such as vaccines) are purposefully immunogen-
ic, immunogenicity in a therapeutic protein product is usually unin-
tentional and can be concerning. Immune responses can affect both 
product effectiveness and patient safety.25 For example, the formation 
of anti-drug antibodies can neutralize (inactivate) a therapeutic pro-
tein, leading to loss of effectiveness. Even when the antibodies are 
not neutralizing, they can alter the pharmacokinetic profile of the 
product26—for instance, by speeding clearance (which reduces half-
life and therefore affects the efficacy profile) in some cases, slowing 
clearance (and prolonging half-life) in other cases, mistargeting the 
protein product (reducing efficacy), or promoting other antibody re-
sponses.27 According to FDA, the safety consequences of immunogen-
icity “may vary wildly and are often unpredictable.”28 Serious possi-
bilities include anaphylaxis, infusion reactions, and cross-reaction 
with endogenous counterparts of the therapeutic product.29 
 Product-specific factors—including product origin, product aggre-
gates, impurities with adjuvant activity, formulation, container clo-
                                                                                                                  
 22. FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, SCIENTIFIC CONSIDERATIONS IN DEMONSTRATING 
BIOSIMILARITY TO A REFERENCE PRODUCT (Apr. 2015) [hereinafter FDA SCIENTIFIC 
CONSIDERATIONS GUIDANCE]. 
 23. Id. at 10.  
 24. Richard Kingham et al., Key Regulatory Guidelines for the Development of Biolog-
ics in the United States and Europe, in BIOLOGICAL DRUG PRODUCTS: DEVELOPMENT AND 
STRATEGIES (Wei Wang & Manmohan Singh eds., 2014).  
 25. See generally FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, IMMUNOGENICITY ASSESSMENT FOR 
THERAPEUTIC PROTEIN PRODUCTS (Aug. 2014), [hereinafter FDA IMMUNOGENICITY 
GUIDANCE] https://www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs/guidances/ucm338856.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
8KUP-B89Z]. 
 26. Pharmacokinetics, broadly speaking, is the study of the effect of the body on the 
drug; pharmacokinetic studies generally measure absorption, distribution, metabolism, 
and/or excretion of the drug. Jennifer Le, Overview of Pharmacokinetics, MERCK MANUAL 
(last updated Apr. 2016); Gerlie Gieser, Clinical Pharmacology 1: Phase 1 Studies and Ear-
ly Drug Development (PowerPoint), at slide 4. 
 27. FDA IMMUNOGENICITY GUIDANCE, supra note 25, at 3.  
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. (listing less acute possibilities which include: fever, rash, myalgia, hematuria, 
proteinuria, central nervous system complications, and hemolytic anemia). 
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sure, and product custody—can increase or decrease the risk of im-
munogenicity.30 Put another way, not only does immunogenicity vary 
by product type (erythropoietin versus tumor necrosis factor inhibi-
tor, for instance), but it can also vary by manufacturer and with 
manufacturing changes. Johnson & Johnson’s experience in the Eu-
ropean Union with Eprex® (recombinant human erythroepoetin) is 
instructive.31 Some patients taking Eprex in the early 2000s in the 
subcutaneous dosage form to treat anemia associated with chronic 
renal failure developed neutralizing antibodies to all erythropoietin, 
including endogenous erythropoietin, which led to a very serious con-
dition, pure red cell aplasia (PRCA). In this condition, the bone mar-
row stops producing red blood cells. In the late 1990s, the company 
had substituted polysorbate 80 for human serum albumin, which had 
previously been used as a stabilizer in its prefilled syringes. The 
company’s investigations showed that uncoated rubber stoppers, 
when exposed to polysorbate 80, released organic compounds (leacha-
tes) into the formulation. Non-clinical testing subsequently indicated 
that these leachates had weak adjuvant properties, which led the 
company to identify them as the probable product-specific cause for 
the increase in erythropoietin antibody-mediated PRCA. Because 
product-specific factors can increase or decrease the risk, rate, and 
type of immunogenicity, FDA expects every biologic application—
including every biosimilar application—to include an assessment of 
the product’s immunogenicity.32  
 Second, not only is the science of biological medicines different, 
but the context for enactment of the biosimilar statute was different. 
When Congress enacted the Hatch-Waxman Amendments in 1984, it 
dropped the legislation into a functional, if weak, generic drug mar-
ketplace. Companies had been marketing generic drugs since the 
                                                                                                                  
 30. Id. at 12-21.  
 31. See generally Katia Boven et al., Epoetin-Associated Pure Red Cell Aplasia in Pa-
tients with Chronic Kidney Disease: Solving the Mystery, 20 (Supp. 3) NEPHROLOGY 
DIALYSIS TRANSPLANTATION iii33, iii34 (2005); see also Johnson & Johnson, Comment Let-
ter on the Passage of the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009 at 2, 3 
(Dec. 23, 2010). 
 32. See generally FDA IMMUNOGENICITY GUIDANCE, supra note 25; FDA SCIENTIFIC 
CONSIDERATIONS GUIDANCE, supra note 22, at 16-18; Susan Kirshner, FDA Immunogenici-
ty Updates, (PowerPoint), at slide 17 (Feb. 2016), http://www.e-i-p.eu/wp-content/uploads/ 
2016/03/Susan-Kirschner-.pdf [https://perma.cc/NR4U-BZ84] (stating that a biosimilar 
applicant should assess “the nature of the immune response (e.g., anaphylaxis, neutraliz-
ing antibody), the clinical relevance and severity of consequences (e.g., loss of efficacy of 
life–saving therapeutic and other adverse effects), the incidence of immune responses, 
[and] the population being studied”); see also Leah A. Christl, Janet Woodcock, & Steven 
Kozlowski, Biosimilars: The US Regulatory Framework, 68 ANN. REV. MED. 234, 250 (2016) 
(“[I]mmunogenicity cannot currently be predicted for complex protein products solely using 
analytical methods. As a scientific matter, a study assessing immunogenicity is generally 
expected.”). 
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1938 enactment of the FDCA. In the early years, these were known 
as “me too” drugs, and they were brought to market without new 
drug applications, on the strength of someone else’s research.33 Alt-
hough this pathway to market was no longer available by the 1970s, 
FDA introduced the abbreviated new drug application (ANDA) in the 
late 1970s, for generic companies seeking to introduce copies of inno-
vative drugs with older NDAs (those reaching the market before 
1962). The agency developed therapeutic equivalence ratings at the 
same time, in response to states that had requested guidance as they 
implemented laws to encourage generic substitution in order to con-
tain drug costs.34 The Hatch-Waxman Amendments were enormously 
important, creating a statutory pathway for copies of newer innova-
tive drugs and creating a scheme for premarket resolution of patent 
disputes. But the scientific standards and regulatory concepts had 
already been ironed out in informal rulemaking, and the skeleton for 
the post-1984 drug marketplace had been in place for years. The 
agency and industry were ready to launch instantly. 
 When Congress enacted the Biologics Price Competition and Inno-
vation Act (BPCIA) in 2010, by way of contrast, it legislated on a 
mostly blank slate.35 The biotechnology industry was only a few dec-
ades old, and the first significant recombinant protein products were 
only beginning to approach patent expiry. The Europeans had au-
thorized only a few comparatively simple biosimilars, and they did so 
pursuant to legislative authority that essentially allowed the Euro-
pean Medicines Agency (EMA) to fill in the details as it went along. 
Guidelines issued by the EMA for a few product classes provided U.S. 
policymakers with templates for consideration, but there was no 
meaningful experience at FDA for the legislature to draw on. Fur-
ther, there was no functional U.S. biosimilar industry to engage in 
the legislative deliberations or to provide real-world experience that 
could inform the drafting.36 State pharmacy laws did not address 
substitution of biological products, nor was there any reason for them 
to do so. The physician and payer communities had barely begun to 
think about the prospect of non-innovative biologics. In short, the 
Congress of the early 1980s took action after FDA had fully devel-
                                                                                                                  
 33. See generally Lietzan, supra note 9, at 100-02. 
 34. See Henry G. Grabowski & John M. Vernon, Substitution Laws and Innovation in 
the Pharmaceutical Industry, 43 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 43 (1979). 
 35. See generally Krista Hessler Carver, Jeffrey Elikan & Erika Lietzan, An Unoffi-
cial Legislative History of the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, 65 
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 671 (2010) (discussing the history of the enacted legislation from 2002 
through enactment). 
 36. Generic drug companies and the generic industry trade association participated in 
the legislative process on behalf of the nascent biosimilar industry. See generally id. 
  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:883 
 
894 
oped the concept of generic drug applications, with a generic industry 
ready to develop copies of newer products, and with states poised to 
mandate automatic substitution. The Congress that produced the 
BPCIA effectively enacted “if we build it they will come” legislation. 
III.   COMPETITION: VARIABILITY AND DYNAMISM IN THE BIOLOGIC 
PATHWAY AND MARKETPLACE 
 These scientific and historical considerations provide important 
context for the narrative offered below. As Section III.A explains, 
largely for scientific reasons, the pathway to market for biosimilar 
biologics today has more in common with the pathway for innovative 
biologics than it does with the pathway for generic drugs. The stat-
ute’s history means that the basic requirements for market entry are 
developing while FDA approves the first products, and the scientific 
context and history together make it likely those requirements will 
evolve. As Section III.B explains, the resulting marketplace for bio-
similars paradoxically combines promotion by sponsors with an ap-
parent lack of product differentiation, and current government reim-
bursement policies perpetuate this “neither fish nor fowl” aspect of 
biosimilars. Many factors could affect market penetration, but over 
time financial considerations—pricing as well as coverage and reim-
bursement rules—could become paramount. The statute allows FDA 
to approve a third class of biologics, interchangeable biologics, but 
there are important unanswered questions about the cost and market 
impact of interchangeability ratings and, therefore, their appeal to 
applicants. 
A.   The Variable and Complex Pathway to Market 
 In large part because of the scientific differences between biologics 
and chemically synthesized drugs, abbreviated applications for bio-
similars are more extensive, expensive, and risky than abbreviated 
applications for generics. Moreover, the pathway will vary from 
product to product and perhaps from applicant to applicant. In these 
respects, it is more like the pathway that innovators take. 
 To begin with, the process is time-consuming, expensive, and 
risky. An abbreviated application for a biosimilar must show that the 
proposed biosimilar is highly similar to its reference product and that 
there are no clinically meaningful differences between the two.37 The 
statute calls for analytical studies (showing the two are highly simi-
lar notwithstanding minor differences in clinically inactive compo-
nents), animal studies (including the assessment of toxicity), and at 
                                                                                                                  
 37. 42 U.S.C. §§ 262(k)(3), 262(i) (2012). 
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least one clinical study (including the assessment of immunogenicity 
and pharmacokinetics or pharmacodynamics) sufficient to demon-
strate safety, purity, and potency in one reference product indication 
for which licensure is sought.38 The first biosimilar application ap-
proved by FDA included structural and functional characterization, 
data from five animal studies, and data from eight clinical trials, in-
cluding two comparative pivotal studies in patients and four pharma-
cokinetic-pharmacodynamic studies in healthy volunteers.39 FDA ap-
proved this application nearly five years after the applicant and 
agency met to discuss the applicant’s planned clinical program, which 
followed several years of analytical and pre-clinical work.40 Hospira’s 
still pending application for biosimilar epoetin alfa reportedly runs 
“hundreds of thousands of pages.”41 
 By way of contrast, a generic drug applicant must prove that the 
proposed generic is the “same as” and “bioequivalent” to its reference 
product.42 That is, the generic drug must have the same active ingre-
dient as well as the same route of administration, dosage form, and 
strength.43 Further, there may not be a significant difference in the 
rate and extent to which the active ingredient or active moiety be-
comes available at the site of drug action when administered at the 
same molar dose.44 A senior agency official explained in 2007 that, in 
contrast with biological medicines, non-biological drugs can usually 
                                                                                                                  
 38. Id. § 262(k)(2). Pharmacodynamics, broadly speaking, is the study of the effects of a 
drug in the body, and pharmacodynamic measures are measurements of biological effects 
that are thought to predict or relate to clinical outcome. Abimbola Farinde, Overview of 
Pharmacodynamics, MERCK MANUAL, https://www.merckmanuals.com/professional/clinical-
pharmacology/pharmacodynamics/overview-of-pharmacodynamics [https://perma.cc/H75W-
2L44] (last updated Oct. 2016). For an explanation of pharmacokinetics, see Gieser, supra 
note 26. 
 39. See generally Sandoz, Advisory Committee Briefing Materials: Available for Public 
Release, Zarxio® (filgrastim) (Jan. 7, 2015); FDA, SUMMARY REVIEW: BLA 125553 (Mar. 6, 
2014). 
 40. Sandoz and FDA met to discuss proposed clinical testing in September 2010, 
Sandoz submitted its application in May 2014, and the agency approved the application in 
March 2015. See FDA, PHARMACOLOGY/TOXICOLOGY BLA REVIEW AND EVALUATION: BLA 
125553 (Jan. 30, 2015). 
 41. Corrected Brief for Defendant-Appellee at 9, Amgen, Inc. v. Hospira, Inc., Docket 
No. 16-02179 (Fed. Cir. June 7, 2016) (Oct. 25, 2016), at 9 (asserting that Hospira’s appli-
cation contained “over 747,000 pages of information”). FDA has signaled that sponsors may 
be conducting more studies than strictly needed for approval, and Amgen has claimed that 
it could have obtained approval of Amjevita on the basis of one phase 3 study but per-
formed a second “to provide added confidence for physicians and patients.” Sue Sutter, 
Biosimilar Sponsors May Be Going Overboard on Clinical Data, FDA Says, PINK SHEET 
(July 13, 2016), https://pink.pharmamedtechbi.com/PS118756/Biosimilar-Sponsors-May-
Be-Going-Overboard-On-Clinical-Data-FDA-Says [https://perma.cc/TL43-ZMSP]. 
 42. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2) (2012). 
 43. Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(ii), (iii). 
 44. 21 C.F.R. § 320.1(e) (2016).  
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be easily characterized, which means making a copy with the same 
active ingredient is relatively easy.45 An ANDA generally comprises 
chemistry, manufacturing, and controls information, including a 
comparative analytical showing, and modest bioequivalence testing.46 
FDA may not require pre-clinical or clinical safety and effectiveness 
data.47 
 The differential in cost for applicants is profound. The Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC) reported in 2009 that generic drug applica-
tions typically take three to five years to assemble, with a corre-
sponding cost of $1 million to $5 million.48 It estimated that biosimi-
lar applications would take eight to ten years to develop, with a cor-
responding cost of $100 million to $200 million.49 Since enactment, 
biosimilar applicants have confirmed this range.50 The high cost of 
developing a biosimilar stems in part from the extensive premarket 
research and development requirements, but also from the cost and 
challenge of designing, building, and qualifying a facility capable of 
reproducibly manufacturing complex and sensitive protein products 
in compliance with current good manufacturing practices.51 
 The risk in biosimilar research and development has also been 
manifest. Of the eight biosimilar applications known to have been 
submitted in 2014 and 2015, more than half were not approved by 
the initial target dates assigned by FDA.52 Celltrion received a com-
                                                                                                                  
 45. See Woodcock et al., supra note 21, at 437 (“[T]he molecular structure of such a 
drug can usually be verified analytically [and consequently] it is fairly easy for a generic-
drug manufacturer to produce a duplicate product containing an active ingredient that is 
the same as the active ingredient in an innovator’s approved drug product.”). 
 46. 21 C.F.R. § 314.94 (contents of an abbreviated application); id. pt. 320 (bioavaila-
bility and bioequivalence). 
 47. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A) (2012) (“The Secretary may not require that an abbreviated 
application contain information in addition to that required by clauses (i) through (viii).”). 
 48. FTC, EMERGING HEALTH CARE ISSUES: FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGIC DRUG COMPETITION 
iii (2009).  
 49. Id. In 2015, the Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development estimated $75 to $250 
million for biosimilars. TUFTS CTR., TUFTS CSDD IMPACT REPORT, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Apr. 2015). 
 50. Hospira, which submitted an application to FDA in 2015 for Retacrit®, a biosimi-
lar epoetin alfa product, projected average costs from $100 million to $200 million. Develop-
ing Biosimilars, HOSPIRA, http://www.hospira.com (last visited May 9, 2017). Celltrion 
stated in March 2014 that it had spent $112 million developing its biosimilar infliximab 
product. Complaint for Declaratory Judgment at 8, Celltrion Healthcare Co. v. Janssen 
Biotech, Inc., No. 14-11613 (D. Mass.) (Mar. 31, 2014). 
 51. See Henry Grabowski & Erika Lietzan, FDA Regulation of Biosimilars, in FDA IN 
THE 21ST CENTURY: THE CHALLENGES OF REGULATING DRUGS AND NEW TECHNOLOGIES 
(Lynch & Cohen eds., 2015).  
 52. See Pending Biosimilars: Biosimilar Applications Submitted to FDA, PINK SHEET 
(Sept. 26, 2016) (providing a table with status of all known biosimilar applications). When 
FDA accepts an application for review, it sets the target date for its decision, also known as 
the application’s “action date.” As a general rule, the action date is ten months later. The 
ten-month cycle was negotiated with the biosimilar industry in connection with statutory 
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plete response letter—meaning that FDA could not approve the ap-
plication—because deficiencies in the analytical data precluded a 
finding that its biosimilar infliximab product was highly similar to 
Remicade.53 The company provided data to address the deficiencies, 
leading to approval in a second review cycle.54 Hospira similarly re-
ceived a complete response letter regarding its biosimilar epoetin alfa 
application.55 
 Unlike the contents of generic drug applications, the contents of 
biosimilar applications—and therefore the time investment, cost, 
and, perhaps, risk involved—may also vary for the foreseeable future. 
There are two reasons for this. 
 First, the data and information needed to support approval as a 
biosimilar may differ from product type to product type, in part be-
cause the characteristics that distinguish biologics from chemically 
synthesized drugs may also distinguish one biologic from the next. 
Thus, when describing the obligations of biosimilar applicants, FDA 
has noted that different protein products may be more or less well 
characterized structurally or functionally.56 There may be varying 
degrees of understanding of the relationship between their structural 
attributes and their clinical performance. Their mechanisms of action 
may or may not be well understood, and some may have more than 
one. The pathologies of the diseases they treat may be more or less 
well understood. There may be considerable or only modest clinical 
experience with the product class. There may or may not be relevant 
pharmacodynamic measures. There may or may not be a meaningful 
correlation between pharmacodynamic and pharmacokinetic results, 
on the one hand, and clinical effectiveness, on the other hand. Fea-
tures relevant to clinical trial design, like half-life and immunogenic-
ity, may vary. All of these considerations influence how one would 
show that two such products are similar. Consequently, the data and 
information needed for biosimilar approval will vary.57 
                                                                                                                  
authorization to assess user fees. FDA, BIOSIMILAR BIOLOGICAL PRODUCT AUTHORIZATION 
PERFORMANCE GOALS AND PROCEDURES FISCAL YEARS 2013 THROUGH 2017; FDA MANUAL 
OF POLICIES AND PROCEDURES, MAPP 6020.8, REV. 1 (June 13, 2016). 
 53. See FDA, MEDICAL OFFICER REVIEW: BLA 125544, at 2 (Apr. 5, 2016) [hereinafter 
FDA, MEDICAL OFFICER REVIEW]; see also 21 C.F.R. § 601.3 (2016) (describing complete 
response letters). 
 54. See FDA, MEDICAL OFFICER REVIEW, supra note 53, at 2. 
 55. Sue Sutter, Biosimilar Denied: Hospira’s Retacrit Could Head Back to FDA in  
First Half 2016, PINK SHEET DAILY (Oct. 27, 2015), https://pink.pharmamedtechbi.com/ 
PS077926/Biosimilar-Denied-Hospiras-Retacrit-Could-Head-Back-To-FDA-In-First-Half-2016 
[https://perma.cc/ZW93-M88S].  
 56. See generally FDA, SCIENTIFIC CONSIDERATIONS GUIDANCE, supra note 22. 
 57. The EMA has issued detailed guidelines specific to biosimilar products containing 
recombinant follicle-stimulating hormone, interferon beta, monoclonal antibodies, recom-
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 Second, the data and information necessary for approval as a bio-
similar may also vary from applicant to applicant within a product 
class. This is because FDA has embraced a “stepwise approach” to 
demonstrating biosimilarity.58 The essence of this approach is moving 
systematically from comparison of structure and function, to compar-
ison of animal toxicity, to comparative human pharmacokinetic and 
pharmacodynamics studies, to comparative clinical immunogenicity 
studies, and then ultimately (and only if necessary) to comparative 
clinical safety and effectiveness trials.59 After each step, FDA has ex-
plained, the applicant should “evaluate the extent to which there is 
residual uncertainty about the biosimilarity of the proposed product 
and identify next steps to try to address that uncertainty.”60 At vari-
ous milestones in the stepwise process, the agency provides advice to 
the applicant after reviewing the data and information collected to 
date.61 Thus, application requirements are tailored not only to the 
product type, but also to the applicant’s findings and the agency’s in-
put at each step. FDA has launched a “biosimilar development pro-
gram,” supported by user fees, to facilitate this collaborative pro-
cess.62 While modifying an overall product development program as 
one proceeds and depending on one’s results is standard fare for in-
novators, it may add to the variability in application contents, cost, 
and timing for biosimilar applicants and has no meaningful counter-
part in the generic drug paradigm.63 
                                                                                                                  
binant erythropoietin, low molecular weight heparin, interferon alpha, recombinant granu-
locyte-colony stimulating factor, somatropin, and recombinant human insulin and insulin 
analogues. These guidelines describe the preclinical and clinical studies necessary and 
provide specific information about study design, such as route of administration, subject 
selection, dosing regimen, duration of trial, primary and secondary endpoints, and data 
analysis. The designs vary considerably. Compare GUIDELINE ON NON-CLINICAL AND 
CLINICAL DEVELOPMENT OF SIMILAR BIOLOGICAL MEDICINAL PRODUCTS CONTAINING 
RECOMBINANT ERYTHROPOIETINS (REVISION), EMEA/CHMP/BMWP/301636/2008 (Mar. 18, 
2010), with GUIDELINE ON SIMILAR BIOLOGICAL MEDICINAL PRODUCTS CONTAINING 
INTERFERON BETA, EMA/CHMP/BMWP/652000/2010 (Feb. 21, 2013). 
 58. See FDA SCIENTIFIC CONSIDERATIONS GUIDANCE, supra note 22, at 2, 7-8. 
 59. Id. at 9-22.   
 60. Id. at 7. 
 61. Id. at 8. 
 62. See generally FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: FORMAL MEETINGS BETWEEN THE 
FDA AND BIOSIMILAR BIOLOGICAL PRODUCT SPONSORS OR APPLICANTS (Nov. 2015); see 
also 21 U.S.C. § 379j-52(a)(1) (2012). 
 63. Bioequivalence testing requirements vary but stay within certain basic parameters. 
For instance, the agency might permit in vitro dissolution testing rather than requiring in 
vivo pharmacokinetic measurements, it might require both fasting and fed conditions for an 
oral product, or it might develop a special approach for an inhaled or topical product. Bioe-
quivalence Recommendations for Specific Products Arranged by Active Ingredient, FDA 
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm0752
07.htm [https://perma.cc/N4Y6-YBBR] (last updated Nov. 15, 2017). 
2017]  THE UNCHARTED WATERS 899 
 
 Like innovators, some biosimilar applicants may be able to mini-
mize their overall premarket burden by submitting the same clinical 
trials to different regulators. This is because regulators in the devel-
oped world—not only the EMA, Health Canada, and FDA, but also 
Japan’s Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare (MHLW), and the 
Australian Therapeutic Goods Administration (TGA), among oth-
ers—are taking similar approaches to biosimilar approval, much as 
they do with innovative drug and biologic approval, and much as they 
did with generic drug pathways in the 1980s.64 Like FDA, these regu-
lators generally require a high degree of analytical similarity, some 
premarket clinical immunogenicity data, comparative pharmacoki-
netic and pharmacodynamic data, and at least one comparative clini-
cal trial using an endpoint that reflects a reference product indica-
tion.65 Because regulators are generally aligning in approach, biosim-
ilar applicants have sought to persuade regulators to accept at least 
some of the same data.66 Because biosimilar applications are compar-
                                                                                                                  
 64. See Barbara Mounho et al., Global Regulatory Standards for the Approval of Bio-
similars, 65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 819 (2010); Peter Bogaert, Erika Lietzan & Laura Sim, 
Biosimilar Regulation: Important Considerations and Global Developments, PLC LIFE SCI. 
HANDBOOK (2011), https://www.cov.com/~/media/files/corporate/publications/2011/01/ 
biosimilar-regulation---important-considerations-and-global-developments---2011.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/DK5M-3BQ3]. 
 65. Mounho et al., supra note 64. As a group of biostatisticians from FDA recently 
explained, this does not mean that the trials must use the same endpoints as an innovator 
would use. The primary goal of the comparative clinical study is to support a finding that 
there are no clinically meaningful differences between the products. In a non-inferiority 
trial to support a pioneer product, by way of contrast, the endpoint must also establish 
treatment effect. This means an interim or surrogate endpoint might be acceptable in a 
clinical study for biosimilar approval, where a clinical endpoint would be necessary for ap-
proval of an innovative produce. See Kun He et al., Statistical Considerations in Evaluating a 
Biosimilar Product in an Oncology Clinical Study, 22 CLINICAL CANCER RES. 5167 (2016). 
 66. See, e.g., GPHA, Comment Letter on Implementation of New Abbreviated Bioge-
neric Pathway Created in the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, 
(Dec. 30, 2010) (“Clearly, one of the most immediate ways for FDA to be proactive is to 
support biogeneric applicants using data previously generated outside the U.S. in other 
highly regulated markets, and encourage them to appropriately build on these studies and 
provide justification or add additional data that appropriately connects the EU efforts to 
the chosen US 351(a) reference product. The entirety of this data set then forms the US 
biogeneric application.”); Novartis, Comment Letter on Implementation of New Abbreviat-
ed Biosimilar Pathway Created in the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 
2009 (Dec. 30, 2010) at 20 (“Therefore, to the extent that any biosimilar has been developed 
and used in another market in which comparable regulatory standards and procedures 
apply, the data on its development and prior use can be of great value to the FDA in evalu-
ating the same candidate product for use in the U.S.”); Derrick Gingery, Biosimilar Market 
Formation Isn’t Going According to Plan, PINK SHEET DAILY (Dec. 18, 2015), 
https://pink.pharmamedtechbi.com/PS078099/Biosimilar-Market-Formation-Isnt-Going-
According-To-Plan [https://perma.cc/C6HM-SLE4] (noting that FDA had not expected so 
many sponsors to seek agency development advice even though they would not submit a 
U.S. application for years, and adding that “sponsors are conducting global development 
programs and want to ensure they will be compliant in the U.S., even though they may file 
for approval somewhere else first”). 
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ative applications, as a practical matter this means submitting to one 
regulator data from clinical trials that used—as a comparator—a 
version of the innovator’s product approved by a different regulator.67 
The EMA and FDA will permit use of non-local comparator products 
for some studies supporting biosimilar approval, if certain conditions 
are met, and Health Canada plans the same.68 Thus, for example, the 
U.S. application for Inflectra contained only one clinical study with 
U.S.-approved Remicade: a single-dose pharmacokinetic study in 213 
healthy volunteers.69 
 Fully global applications may not be possible, however. Legal con-
siderations might require U.S. applicants to use the U.S. reference 
product in at least one trial.70 Also, regulators may have differing 
views of the scientific issues raised by studies, as diverging reactions 
to the biosimilar infliximab applications demonstrate.71 Whether and 
to what extent biosimilar applicants will be able to minimize their 
                                                                                                                  
 67. Use of a foreign-approved comparator product in a trial for domestic approval is 
different from submitting data from trials conducted in non-U.S. populations in non-U.S. 
locations. In the first example, a company is using, as the control in its trial, a product that 
FDA has not approved. This trial could occur anywhere in the world, including in the Unit-
ed States. In the second example, the company is using an FDA-approved product as the 
control, but the trial site is in another country. FDA refers to the latter as a “foreign clini-
cal study.” See 21 C.F.R. § 312.120 (2016) (governing submission of data from foreign  
clinical studies). 
 68. FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: BIOSIMILARS: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 
REGARDING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BIOLOGICS PRICE COMPETITION AND INNOVATION ACT 
OF 2009 (Apr. 2015), at 8 [hereinafter FDA Q&A GUIDANCE]; EMA, GUIDELINE ON SIMILAR 
BIOLOGICAL MEDICINAL PRODUCTS, CHMP/437/04 REV. 1 (Oct. 23, 2014) § 3.2 [hereinafter 
EMA OVERARCHING GUIDELINE]; HEALTH CANADA, DRAFT-REVISED GUIDANCE DOCUMENT: 
INFORMATION AND SUBMISSION REQUIREMENTS FOR BIOSIMILAR BIOLOGIC DRUGS § 2.1.3 
(Nov. 14, 2015). 
 69. See Celltrion, Advisory Committee Briefing Materials: Available for Public Re-
lease: CT-P13 (infliximab biosimilar) 71 (Feb. 9, 2016). 
 70. The PHSA requires comparison with a product licensed by FDA. See 42 U.S.C. § 
262(i)(4) (2012).  
 71. Remicade (infliximab) is approved for eight indications in two categories: rheu-
matic and related diseases (like rheumatoid arthritis) and inflammatory bowel diseases 
(like Crohn’s Disease). Celltrion performed a pivotal comparative efficacy and safety study 
in patients with rheumatoid arthritis, as well as a pivotal comparative pharmacokinetic 
study in patients with ankylosing spondylitis. Although Celltrion studied only two uses, 
the European Commission authorized Remsima for all eight, using a process known as 
“extrapolation.” This allows an applicant to submit a scientific argument that the showings 
already made (a lack of clinically meaningful differences with respect to one patient popu-
lation and indication, plus the balance of the data package, including analytical data) justi-
fy extrapolating to approval for additional populations and indications. FDA took the same 
approach. Health Canada, however, approved Remsima for only the four rheumatic indica-
tions. It denied the four gastrointestinal indications, identifying differences between the 
products that “could have an impact on the clinical safety and efficacy of these products in 
these indications.” HEALTH CANADA, SUMMARY BASIS OF DECISION FOR REMSIMA (Apr. 1, 
2014); see also Feagan et al., The Challenge of Indication Extrapolation for Infliximab Bio-
similars, 42 BIOLOGICALS 177, 178 (2014).  
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premarket burden by harmonizing application packages in differing 
jurisdictions, as innovators often can, remains to be seen and—as the 
infliximab experience suggests—may vary from product to product. 
 Table 1 illustrates the variability of the biologic framework, using 
publicly available information about the first four approved biosimi-
lar biologics. The variability is manifest; the number of preclinical 
studies varies; the number of clinical pharmacokinetic studies varies; 
and the number, size, and length of clinical efficacy studies vary. For 
instance, the first application (Zarxio) contained a pivotal clinical 
safety and efficacy study using the U.S.-approved reference product; 
none of the rest did. The fourth application (Amjevita) contained few-
er animal and human pharmacokinetic studies, but the sponsor in-
cluded two clinical efficacy studies. One biosimilar was studied in 683 
subjects, another in over 1000. One pivotal study lasted 77 weeks, 
and another 26 weeks.  
 
Table 1: Comparison of Biosimilar Applications72 
Description 
Zarzio 
Filgrastim is a hormone-like growth factor 
required for the growth and development of 
hematopoietic progenitor cells. 
Inflectra 
Infliximab is a monoclonal antibody that 
targets tumor necrosis factor. 
Erelzi 
Etanercept is a fusion protein that targets 
tumor necrosis factor. 
Amjevita 
Adalimumab is a monoclonal antibody that 
targets tumor necrosis factor. 
Preclinical 
studies 
Zarzio 
Five animal studies comparing Zarxio with 
EU Neupogen, assessing toxicity, toxicoki-
netics, local tolerance, and pharmacody-
namics. 
Inflectra 
One human tissue and five animal studies 
(three compliant with good laboratory prac-
tices), comparing Inflectra and EU Remi-
cade, assessing pharmacology, pharmaco-
kinetics, toxicology, and toxicokinetics. 
Erelzi 
• One dose-finding study in mice 
• Four animal studies comparing Erelzi 
with EU Enbrel, assessing PD, PK, and 
toxicity including local tolerance and 
immunogenicity 
                                                                                                                  
 72. The information in this table is taken from the sponsor and agency briefing mate-
rials prepared for the advisory committee meetings considering the applications in ques-
tion, and, where available, on Drugs@FDA, the review documents. 
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Table 1: Comparison of Biosimilar Applications72 
Amjevita 
Two animal studies comparing Amjevita 
with US Humira, pme assessomg toxicoki-
netics and the other assessing toxicity and 
toxicokinetics. 
Clinical 
PK/PD 
studies 
Zarzio 
• One PK/PD study in healthy volunteers 
comparing Zarxio with US Neupogen 
(pivotal study) 
• Four PK/PD studies in healthy volun-
teers comparing Zarxio with EU 
Neupogen 
Inflectra 
• One PK/PD study comparing Inflectra, 
EU Remicade, and US Remicade, in 
healthy subjects (pivotal study) 
• One PK study comparing Inflectra and 
EU Remicade in patients with ankylos-
ing spondylitis (AS) (pivotal study) 
• An open-label extension of the AS study 
Erelzi 
• Three PK studies in healthy subjects; 
two compared Erelzi with EU Enbrel, 
and one compared Erelzi with US 
Enbrel 
• One cross-study comparison of two stud-
ies in the last bullet, to establish a 
bridge from EU Enbrel to US Enbre. 
• An open-label cross-over study of Erelzi 
using two different devices 
Amjevita 
One PK study comparing Amjevita, US 
Humira, and EU Humira in healthy volun-
teers. 
Clinical 
safety and 
efficacy 
studies 
Zarzio 
• One randomized, double-blind study 
comparing Zarxio and US Neupogen in 
patients with breast cancer (pivotal 
study) 
• Two open-label, single-arm studies of 
Zarzio, one in breast cancer patients and 
one in healthy stem cell donors 
Inflectra 
• One randomized, double-blind study 
comparing Inflectra and EU Remicade 
in patients with rheumatoid arthritis 
(RA) (pivotal study) 
• An open-label extension of the RA study 
• A pilot study comparing Inflectra and 
EU Remicade in RA patients in the Phil-
ippines, two double blind studies (in 
Russia and in Japan) comparing Inflec-
tra and EU Remicade in RA patients, 
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Table 1: Comparison of Biosimilar Applications72 
and an open label extension of the Ja-
pan study 
Erelzi 
One randomized, double-blind study com-
paring Erelzi with EU Enbrel in patients 
with plaque psoriasis. 
Amjevita 
• One randomized, double-blind study 
comparing Amjevita and US Humira in 
patients with RA 
• One randomized, double-blind study 
comparing Amjevita with EU Humira in 
patients with plaque psoriasis 
Duration of 
pivotal 
clinical 
efficacy 
and safety 
study or 
studies 
Zarzio 77 weeks 
Inflectra 54 weeks 
Erelzi 52 weeks 
Amjevita 
• 26 weeks (RA) 
• 52 weeks (plaque psoriasis) 
Total num-
ber of pa-
tients en-
rolled in 
submitted 
trials 
Zarzio 
• 174 healthy volunteers 
• 388 breast cancer patients receiving 
myelosuppressive chemotherapy 
• 121 healthy stem cell volunteers 
Inflectra 
• 213 healthy volunteers 
• 606 patients with rheumatoid arthritis 
• 250 patients with ankylosing spondylitis 
Erelzi 
• 216 healthy volunteers 
• 531 patients with plaque psoriasis 
Amjevita 
• 203 healthy subjects 
• 467 patients with rheumatoid arthritis 
• 350 patients with plaque psoriasis 
Studies 
using the 
U.S.-
licensed 
reference 
product 
Zarzio 
• One PK/PK study 
• One clinical safety and efficacy study 
Inflectra One PK/PD study 
Erelzi 
One PK study (and the preplanned cross 
study report) 
Amjevita 
• One PK study 
• One clinical safety and efficacy study 
Number of 
indications 
(or patient 
populations 
studied) & 
number of 
indications 
Zarzio 
• One patient population studied 
• Five indications approved 
Inflectra 
• Two patient populations studied 
• Seven indications approved 
Erelzi 
• One patient population studied 
• Five indications approved 
  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:883 
 
904 
Table 1: Comparison of Biosimilar Applications72 
approved 
Amjevita 
• Two patient populations studied 
• Seven indications approved 
   
 The data and information necessary for licensure as a biosimilar 
are likely to change over time. The Europeans, who began authoriz-
ing biosimilars in 2006, have already reworked several of their basic 
framework guidelines, including the general guidelines on analytical 
testing and on non-clinical and clinical testing.73 They have also re-
worked—or are in the process of reworking—some of the class-
specific guidelines, such as the guidelines for biosimilar erythropoiet-
in and granulocyte-colony stimulating factor.74 FDA’s expectations 
will surely evolve over time, as well, and the statute is written to ac-
commodate this evolution.75 Moreover, the two regulators have estab-
lished a working group for collaboration on biosimilar issues, with 
the express goal of avoiding “regulatory divergence” that may delay 
access to medicines.76 On the whole, the EMA seems to be taking a 
less conservative approach than it did in 2006.77 Collaboration with 
the EMA could influence FDA to become less conservative, itself, over 
time.78 The agency has already signaled intent to minimize the ani-
                                                                                                                  
 73. EMA OVERARCHING GUIDELINE, supra note 68 (revising earlier version adopted in 
September 2005); EMA, GUIDELINE ON SIMILAR BIOLOGICAL MEDICINAL PRODUCTS 
CONTAINING BIOTECHNOLOGY-DERIVED PROTEINS AS ACTIVE SUBSTANCE: QUALITY ISSUES, 
EMA/CHMP/BWP/247713/2012 REV. 1 (May 22, 2014) (revising earlier version adopted in 
February 2006); EMA, GUIDELINE ON SIMILAR BIOLOGICAL MEDICINAL PRODUCTS 
CONTAINING BIOTECHNOLOGY-DERIVED PROTEINS AS ACTIVE SUBSTANCE: NON-CLINICAL AND 
CLINICAL ISSUES, EMEA/CHMP/BMWP/42832/2005 REV. 1 (Dec. 18, 2014) (revising earlier 
version adopted in February 2006).  
 74. See, e.g., EMA, CONCEPT PAPER ON THE REVISION OF THE GUIDELINE ON NON-CLINICAL 
AND CLINICAL DEVELOPMENT OF SIMILAR BIOLOGICAL MEDICINAL PRODUCTS CONTAINING 
RECOMBINANT GRANULOCYTE-COLONY STIMULATING FACTOR, EMA/CHMP/BMWP/214262/2015 
(July 23, 2015). 
 75. The statute lays out a default of analytical, animal, and clinical studies, adding 
that FDA may determine that any of these elements is “unnecessary” in a particular appli-
cation. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(2)(A)(ii) (2012). 
 76. FDA, European Commission and EMA Reinforce Collaboration to Advance Medicine 
Development and Evaluation, EUR. MEDS. AGENCY (July 14, 2015), http://www.ema.europa.eu/ 
ema/index.jsp?curl=pages/news_and_events/news/2015/07/news_detail_002367.jsp&mid=WC0b
01ac058004d5c1 [https://perma.cc/RMN9-83TB]. 
 77. The class-specific guidance documents have become more detailed and prescrip-
tive, but the overarching guideline now states that, in some situations, pharmacodynam-
ic endpoints may suffice and a clinical efficacy trial may not be needed. EMA 
OVERARCHING GUIDELINE, supra note 68, § 3.3; see also Ian Schofield, Biosimilars in EU 
Seeing Reduced Clinical Data Requirements, PINK SHEET (May 13, 2016), 
https://pink.pharmamedtechbi.com/PS079399/Biosimilars-In-EU-Seeing-Reduced-Clinical-
Data-Requirements [https://perma.cc/39H4-W4EK]. 
 78. FDA is generally more conservative than its European counterpart, however. See, 
e.g., W. Kip Viscusi & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Regulating Ambiguous Risks: The Less Than 
Rational Regulation of Pharmaceuticals, 44 J. LEGAL STUD. S387, S389-90 (2015) (noting 
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mal and clinical studies necessary for licensure.79 And the stepwise 
approach described in its guidance is essentially a front-loaded and 
iterative application process designed to accomplish precisely this 
result. 
 How quickly the U.S. requirements change, whether they change 
across the board or for some product types more quickly than others, 
and just how much they will change remains to be seen. By way of 
contrast, though, the basic approach to generic drug approval has not 
changed meaningfully in thirty years. 
B.   Neither Fish nor Fowl in the Marketplace 
 The marketplace of biologics and biosimilars may differ profound-
ly from the marketplace of innovative drugs and generic drugs. Bio-
similars are, to borrow an old English proverb, neither fish nor fowl.80 
They will be presented and treated both like, and unlike, innovative 
products. 
 1.   The Inapplicability of the Generic Market Penetration Model 
 When FDA approves a generic drug, it issues a “therapeutic 
equivalence” rating, indicating whether, in its judgment, the generic 
can be substituted for a prescribed reference product, “with the full 
expectation that the substituted product will produce the same clini-
cal effect and safety profile as the prescribed product.”81 The agency 
designates a generic drug as therapeutically equivalent to its refer-
ence drug—gives it an “A” rating in the Orange Book—if the two are 
“pharmaceutical equivalents” and “can be expected to have the same 
clinical effect and safety profile when administered to patients under 
the conditions specified in the labeling.”82 In particular, the two must 
have the same active ingredient, route of administration, dosage 
form, and strength, and they must be bioequivalent.83 These are the 
same as the requirements for generic drug approval in the first in-
stance.84 Thus, a generic drug is, by definition, therapeutically equiv-
                                                                                                                  
perceived drug lag between the United States and Europe, ranging in time from a study in 
1980 to an example from 2002). Divergence between the two regulators therefore remains 
possible. 
 79. See, e.g., FDA SCIENTIFIC CONSIDERATIONS GUIDANCE, supra note 22, at 13-14. 
 80. See MORRIS P. TILLEY, A DICTIONARY OF THE PROVERBS IN ENGLAND IN THE 
SIXTEENTH AND SEVENTEENTH CENTURIES 218-19 (1950). 
 81. FDA, APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS WITH THERAPEUTIC EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS 
vii-viii (36th ed. 2016) [hereinafter ORANGE BOOK].  
 82. Id. at vii.  
 83. Id. 
 84. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A) (2012). 
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alent to its reference product.85 No additional showing needs to be 
made. 
 By way of contrast, biosimilar biologics are not inherently thera-
peutically equivalent to their reference products. Congress actually 
created two new types of biologics in 2010: biosimilar biologics and 
interchangeable biologics.86 Interchangeable biologics are subject to a 
different standard of approval.87 The sponsor of an interchangeable 
biologic must show not only that its product is biosimilar, but also 
that its product can be expected to produce the same clinical result in 
any given patient and, in the case of a product administered more 
than once to a patient (true of most therapeutic proteins), that the 
risk of alternating or switching between the products is no greater 
than the risk of using the reference product alone.88 An interchange-
able biologic—not a biosimilar biologic—“may be substituted for the 
reference product without the intervention of the health care provid-
er who prescribed the reference product.”89 This makes interchangea-
bility determinations for biologics analogous to therapeutic equiva-
lence ratings for drugs, and interchangeable biologics—not biosimilar 
biologics—analogous to generic drugs. 
 Market penetration by generic drugs is both swift and automatic. 
When a prescriber specifies a brand product, state pharmacy law 
generally leads the dispensing pharmacist to substitute an A-rated 
generic drug.90 An examination of new molecular entities experienc-
ing initial generic entry in 2011 and 2012 found that the average 
brand retained only 16% of the market after one year.91 The same 
study also found that one-year market erosion had increased dramat-
ically over the preceding decade.92 Another study found that six drugs 
                                                                                                                  
 85. A generic drug approved pursuant to a suitability petition (with a variation in 
route of administration, dosage form, or strength or in one of two active ingredients) is not 
therapeutically equivalent. See infra note 105. 
 86. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 262(k) (2012) (“Licensure of biological products as biosimilar 
or interchangeable.” (emphasis added)), with id. § 262(i)(2) (defining biosimilar biologic), 
with (i)(3) (defining interchangeable biologic). 
 87. Compare id. §§ 262(k)(2) (describing biosimilar application contents), and 
262(k)(3) (laying out biosimilar standard of approval), with (k)(4) (interchangeability 
standard of approval). 
 88. Id. § 262(k)(4). 
 89. Id. § 262(i)(3).  
 90. State laws vary. Some explicitly cross-reference the Orange Book, while others 
refer to therapeutic equivalents, and others refer to generics. Some states characterize 
substitution as permissive, and others characterize it as mandatory, albeit subject to over-
ride by the treating physician. See New York v. Actavis, 787 F.3d 638, 645 (2d Cir. 2015) 
(describing variation in state substitution laws). 
 91. Henry Grabowski et al., Recent Trends in Brand-Name and Generic Drug Compe-
tition, 17 J. MED. ECON. 207, 212 (2014).  
 92. Id.  
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that lost exclusivity between 2009 and 2013 lost 60% of their market 
share within (on average) three months of generic entry.93 Automatic 
therapeutic equivalence ratings, working in concert with state phar-
macy laws, drive this rapid generic market penetration. In contrast, 
because biosimilar biologics will not be deemed interchangeable by 
FDA or substitutable under state pharmacy laws, they must achieve 
market penetration differently.94 If a biosimilar is to be dispensed to 
a patient, it must be prescribed—selected by a treating physician for 
that patient. State law will not make the choice automatically. 
 2.   Decisionmakers Influencing Market Penetration 
 The patient’s healthcare provider is only one of the parties playing 
a role in the choice of medicine for any particular patient. Payers will 
also play a pivotal role, including through the decisions made by 
their formulary committees. A formulary is a list of medicines for use 
in prevention, treatment, or cure of diseases and conditions.95 Many 
entities involved in healthcare delivery and finance—including hospi-
tals, other inpatient facilities, Medicaid,96 Medicare,97 private insur-
ance companies, pharmacy benefit managers, employers, and man-
aged care organizations—use formularies as a way to manage costs 
while ensuring safe and effective treatment of patients.98 A formulary 
committee will make the basic coverage decision about a biosimilar, 
and it may influence market penetration with the cost-management 
strategies that it adopts.99 
                                                                                                                  
 93. Murray L. Aitken et al., The Regulation of Prescription Drug Competition and 
Market Responses: Patterns in Prices and Sales Following Loss of Exclusivity 6-7 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 19487 2013), http://www.nber.org/papers/ 
w19487.pdf [https://perma.cc/KS8G-XFWC].  
 94. States are amending their pharmacy laws to address biologic substitution, just as 
those laws currently authorize drug substitution. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 2549A 
(2016); FLA. STAT. § 465.0252 (2016); IND. CODE § 16-42-25-4 (2016); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 
112, § 12EE (2016); N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-02.1-14.3 (2016); OR. REV. STAT. § 689.522 
(2016); UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-17b-605.5 (2015); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-3408.04 (2016). None 
of the new laws deems biosimilar biologics substitutable; instead, they authorize substitu-
tion of interchangeable biologics. 
 95. ACAD. OF MANAGED CARE PHARMACY (AMCP), FORMULARY MANAGEMENT (2009), 
http://www.amcp.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=9298 [https://perma.cc/HXX3-7TUR]. 
 96. Medicaid, which funds health care for persons of limited means, is administered 
by the states and funded by the state and federal governments together. See generally 42 
U.S.C. § 1396 (2012). Each state prepares its own plan, which must comply with federal 
law and regulations. 
 97. Medicare is the federally funded health insurance program for persons over 65 
years of age (and certain younger persons with disabilities). See generally id. § 1395.  
 98. AMCP, supra note 95. 
 99. See generally JACK HOADLEY, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., THE EFFECT OF FORMULARIES 
AND OTHER COST MANAGEMENT TOOLS ON ACCESS TO MEDICATIONS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE 
MMA AND PROPOSED REGULATIONS (2004), https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/ 
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 To begin with, a formulary committee might simply decline to cov-
er the reference product, excluding the product from coverage and 
listing only the biosimilar.100 Or a formulary committee might adopt a 
tiered formulary to drive patients to the biosimilar. In this layered 
approach to cost-sharing, a preferred medication (the biosimilar) is 
placed in a tier that involves lower costs for the patient, while a non-
preferred medication (the reference product) is placed in a higher-
cost tier.101 Or the committee might impose a “prior authorization” 
requirement, so that the patient must obtain permission before a 
particular medication (the reference product) will be covered.102 Fur-
ther, it could impose therapeutic interchange, sometimes called non-
medical switching or therapeutic substitution. This entails switching 
a patient between unrelated products in the same therapeutic class—
i.e., authorizing the pharmacist to dispense a formulary-listed thera-
peutic alternative (the biosimilar) in place of a non–formulary medi-
cation or a non-preferred formulary medication (the reference prod-
uct) without contacting the prescriber.103 Therapeutic interchange in 
the biologic context could mean dispensing a biosimilar in lieu of the 
reference product or instead of another product in the same class—
dispensing Zarxio (filgrastim-sndz) instead of Neupogen (filgrastim), 
its reference product, or instead of Granix® (tbo-filgrastim), another 
innovative filgrastim product, or indeed instead of Neulasta (pegfil-
grastim), a newer innovative product in the same class. 
 In short, although the physician plays the primary formal role in 
selection of a patient’s treatment in the biologic framework, another 
entity involved in healthcare delivery and finance may force or at 
least profoundly influence the choice. Formulary committees could, in 
                                                                                                                  
2013/01/the-effect-of-formularies-and-other-cost-management-tools-on-access-to-medications-an-
analysis-of-the-mma-and-proposed-regulations.pdf [https://perma.cc/65ZC-LA3G]. Formulary 
committees are also known as “pharmacy and therapeutics committees” or “P&T committees.”  
 100. CVS/Caremark, which covers 75 million Americans, took precisely this approach 
in its 2017 formulary, dropping Neupogen in favor of its biosimilar Zarxio. 2017 Formulary 
Strategy, CVS HEALTH (Aug. 5, 2016), http://insights.cvshealth.com/sites/default/files/cvs-
health-insights-2017-formulary-strategy-overview-august-2016.pdf; Alison Kodjak, Will 
Your Prescription Meds Be Covered Next Year? Better Check!, NPR HEALTH SHOTS (Aug. 15, 
2016, 4:32 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2016/08/15/489790412/will-your-
prescription-meds-be-covered-next-year-better-check. 
 101. See, e.g., AMGEN, 2016 TRENDS IN BIOSIMILARS REPORT 25-26 (2016) (discussing 
possibility of tiering). 
 102.  AMCP, PRIOR AUTHORIZATION (2012), http://www.amcp.org/prior_authorization/ 
[https://perma.cc/P232-RM5G]. 
 103. See AM. SOC’Y OF HEALTH-SYS. PHARMACISTS, ASHP GUIDELINES ON THE PHARMACY 
AND THERAPEUTICS COMMITTEE AND THE FORMULARY SYSTEM 212 (2008), https://www.ashp.org/-
/media/assets/policy-guidelines/docs/guidelines/gdl-pharmacy-therapeutics-committee-formulary-
system.ashx?la=en&hash=EF1E4214CC91C65097AEEECE91BF6EC985AE3E56 
[https://perma.cc/TFY8-5THZ]. 
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a sense, play the role for biosimilars that state substitution laws play 
for generic drugs. 
 3.   Factors Affecting Market Penetration 
 When considering their choices, physicians and payers will be 
choosing among products that, by law, are not meaningfully different. 
Financial considerations are thus likely to be paramount. 
 (a)   Lack of Meaningful Differences 
 The primary features of a biosimilar must be the same as those of 
the reference product; the statute requires that it have the same 
route of administration, dosage form, and strength.104 The biologic 
statute is less flexible in this regard than the drug statute. Although 
a generic drug must ordinarily have the same route of administra-
tion, dosage form, and strength as its reference product, the appli-
cant may vary any of these features and still file an ANDA if FDA 
has approved a “suitability” petition.105 The agency must in turn ap-
prove this petition unless it concludes that new safety or effective-
ness studies would be needed.106 There is no comparable option in the 
biologic statute, which means that if these features are changed, a 
biosimilar application is not permitted. 
 In addition, a generic drug applicant may vary any aspect of the 
innovative product and still file an abbreviated application, under a 
different provision of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments. The resulting 
application, known as a “505(b)(2) application” rather than an ANDA, 
is a hybrid application. It is partially generic (relying on an earlier 
innovator’s research) and partially innovative (supporting new fea-
tures with original research).107 The ANDA is less expensive and gen-
erally leads to an automatically substitutable product, but the 
505(b)(2) pathway is always available to a generic applicant.108 A ge-
                                                                                                                  
 104. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(2)(A)(i)(IV) (2012).  
 105. 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(j)(2)(A)(iii), 355(j)(2)(C) (2012).  
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. § 355(b)(2); FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: APPLICATIONS COVERED BY 
SECTION 505(B)(2) (draft) (Oct. 1999), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/Guidances/ 
ucm079345.pdf [https://perma.cc/TS4B-RSJC]; 21 C.F.R. § 314.54 (2016) (describing con-
tents of a 505(b)(2) application). Like an ANDA, a 505(b)(2) application is subject to the 
Hatch–Waxman premarket patent litigation scheme. 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3) (2012). 
 108. Because a 505(b)(2) application contains original clinical data and generally does 
not lead to a substitutable product, some might be tempted to view the application as anal-
ogous to the new biosimilar application, particularly for purposes of understanding market 
penetration. Indeed, because FDA has approved some protein products under the drug 
provisions, the first follow-on version of a biotechnology-derived therapeutic protein prod-
uct was, in fact, a 505(b)(2) product. The Omnitrope (somatropin recombinant) application 
cited FDA’s approval of Genotropin® (somatropin recombinant). Although the Omnitrope 
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neric drug company might use this option if patent considerations 
compelled it to propose a variation (such as a modification to the ac-
tive ingredient or formulation) that required clinical testing and thus 
precluded an ANDA. A generic drug company might use this option 
to introduce a second-generation product that it believed would be 
more profitable than a strict copy. The hybrid approach—relying on 
the innovator’s data but proposing deliberate modifications—is not 
an option for biosimilar applicants.109 Not only does the biologic stat-
ute lack a provision corresponding to section 505(b)(2), but it affirma-
tively states that a biosimilar applicant may not propose a “condition 
of use” that has not been approved for the reference product.110 Thus, 
a second biologic applicant that wants to vary from or improve on a 
reference biological product must file a full application supported en-
tirely by original research that it sponsored or has a right to refer-
ence.111 
                                                                                                                  
experience may be instructive, caution is warranted before generalizing from products 
approved on the basis of 505(b)(2) applications—for two reasons: 
  First, although Omnitrope was found highly similar to its reference product, the 
standard of approval was safety and effectiveness. An applicant using the 505(b)(2) path-
way is therefore not limited in the scope of approval; it may change the active ingredient, 
propose new uses, and develop new routes of administration. The scope of approval is lim-
ited only by the sponsor’s imagination, its research capabilities, and scientific possibilities. 
The biosimilar applicant, in contrast, is expected to duplicate the reference product, as 
closely as scientifically feasible, and approval is based on similarity. 
  Second, FDA’s interpretation and implementation of section 505(b)(2) has evolved 
and varied over the years, which would complicate aggregating data for analysis. For in-
stance, Celgene’s application for Thalomid® was a 505(b)(2) application, not because it 
cited a previously approved application but because it was largely based on published liter-
ature. Pfizer used section 505(b)(2) for Zyrtec–D®, which combined cetirizine and 
pseudoephedrine, though it marketed the original Zyrtec®. Elan used section 505(b)(2) for 
Duraclon (clonidine hydrochloride), when it proposed a new dosage form (epidural admin-
istration) and formulation to treat cancer pain. See generally Letter from FDA to [Kath-
leen] M. Sanzo, Jeffrey B. Chasnow, Stephan E. Lawton, and William R. Rakoczy, Re: 
Docket Nos. 2001P-0323/CP1 & C5, 2002P-0447/CP1, and 2003P-0408/CP1 (Oct. 14, 2003), 
https://www.pharmamedtechbi.com/~/media/Images/Publications/Archive/The%20Pink%20Sheet/6
5/042/00650420004/031020fda505b2response.pdf [https://perma.cc/J8M7-NXLG]. While the mar-
ket penetration of Omnitrope may be pertinent to the market penetration of biosimilars 
licensed under the BPCIA, the market penetration of other products with 505(b)(2) applica-
tions would be less instructive. 
 109. Congress considered and rejected language modeled on section 505(b)(2), for the 
biologic statute. H.R. 6257 § 3(a)(2), 109th Cong. (2006). For an additional perspective on 
this issue, see generally Janet Freilich, Patent Infringement in the Context of Follow-On 
Biologics, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 9 (2012) (suggesting that biosimilar companies may be 
able to make manufacturing changes, formulation changes, and packaging changes to 
avoid innovator patents, but that FDA is likely to more tightly regulate cell culture condi-
tions and purification, giving biosimilar applicants “less scope” to make changes that will 
bring them outside the range of equivalents for the innovator’s product). 
 110. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(2)(A)(i)(III) (2012).  
 111. If one applicant purchases a right to reference another applicant’s data, the result-
ing application is a full application not a biosimilar application. Cf. 21 C.F.R. § 314.3 (2016) 
(explaining right of reference for NDAs). It is theoretically possible that FDA will construe 
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 Not only is the biologic statute less flexible than the drug statute, 
limiting biosimilar applicants to attempted duplicates, but FDA has 
apparently decided that the labeling of a biosimilar—the package in-
sert with instructions for prescriber—should be virtually identical to 
the labeling of its reference product.112 The agency has borrowed this 
approach from the generic framework; the drug statute requires ge-
neric drugs to have the same labeling as their reference products.113 
Although the biologic statute is silent, the comparative showing in a 
biosimilar application is analogous to the comparative showing in an 
ANDA; it is intended to justify the applicant’s reliance on FDA’s ap-
proval of the reference product.114 Because the innovator’s research 
proves the safety and effectiveness of the biosimilar product, the the-
ory goes, biosimilar labeling should reflect the innovator’s research, 
rather than the biosimilar applicant’s research.115 
                                                                                                                  
the biologic statute to permit innovative supplements to approved biosimilar applications, 
but this would probably be challenged in court. See Lietzan, supra note 9, at 152 n.206.  
 112. Although FDA had not issued a final decision on this issue when this Article was 
prepared, the agency had: (1) issued draft labeling guidance, (2) responded to three citizen 
petitions relating to labeling, and (3) approved the labeling for four biosimilar biologics. 
FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: LABELING FOR BIOSIMILAR PRODUCTS (draft) (Mar. 2016) 
[hereinafter FDA DRAFT LABELING GUIDANCE]; Letter from FDA to Perry Siatis, Meredith 
Miller, William Chin, and Kay Holcombe, Re: Docket Nos. FDA-2015-P-2000, FDA-2015-P-
4529, FDA-2015-P-5022 (July 12, 2016). These materials indicate that biosimilar labeling 
will include a statement that the product is a biosimilar and will explain the concept of 
biosimilarity, but will otherwise generally adopt the text of the reference product labeling 
word for word, changing product names where appropriate. For instance, § 14.1 of the 
Neupogen labeling begins with an Amgen study assessing the “safety and efficacy of 
NEUPOGEN to decrease the incidence of infection.” AMGEN, NEUPOGEN® PRESCRIBING 
INFORMATION § 14.1 (2016), http://pi.amgen.com/~/media/amgen/repositorysites/pi-amgen-
com/neupogen/neupogen_pi_hcp_english.ashx [https://perma.cc/XN3W-WF9U]. The same 
section of the Zarxio labeling begins with the same study and same sentence, but it refers to the 
“safety and efficacy of filgrastim to decrease the incidence of infection.” ZARXIO PRESCRIBING 
INFORMATION § 14.1 (2016) (emphasis added), https://dailymed.nlm.nih.gov/dailymed/fda/ 
fdaDrugXsl.cfm?setid=fe707775-a0ae-41b5-a744-28c41889fce8&type=display [https://perma.cc/ 
MH7R-8AL8]. 
 113. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(v) (2012). The drug statute allows differences due to per-
mitted deviations in the generic drug’s route of administration, dosage form, strength, or 
active ingredient (in a combination product), or because the drugs are produced or distrib-
uted by different manufacturers. Id. It also implicitly permits the generic applicant to omit 
indications claimed by patent. Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(viii).   
 114. FDA DRAFT LABELING GUIDANCE, supra note 112, at 3.  
 115. Despite use of generic–style labeling, biosimilar applicants may be treated like 
drug innovators—rather than like generic drug applicants—in product liability litigation. 
That is, they may not benefit from preemption the way that generic drug companies do, for 
the following reason. As a general rule, labeling must be revised promptly to include new 
warnings. 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(c)(6)(i) (2017). FDA’s regulation governing changes to ap-
proved drugs permits this type of labeling change to be made unilaterally and described in 
a supplement that FDA reviews after the fact. 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(6)(iii) (2012). Although 
this regulation applies to generic drugs, the portion permitting unilateral safety-related 
labeling changes does not apply. 21 C.F.R. § 314.97 (2008); Brief for the United States as 
Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 25, Pliva v. Mensing, Nos. 09-993, 09-1039, 109-
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 In the absence of automatic substitution, biosimilar applicants 
plan to promote their products.116 But the preceding paragraphs sug-
gest their promotional strategies will need to be different from inno-
vator promotional strategies. The challenge lies in promoting a prod-
uct against its competition in the absence of clinically meaningful 
differences between the products. At most, a biosimilar applicant will 
have minor distinctions to point out. Because a biosimilar applicant 
need not seek approval for all reference product indications, routes of 
administration, dosage forms, and strengths, biosimilars to the same 
reference product may differ from each other with respect to scope of 
approval.117 There may also be differences in formulation and deliv-
ery device from other biosimilars and even the reference product, 
which could be described.118 The biosimilar applicant will not be able 
to suggest clinically meaningful differences between its product and 
the reference product, however, as this would be inconsistent with 
the standard of approval itself.119 Further, FDA’s decision that bio-
similar labeling should generally copy the reference product label-
                                                                                                                  
1501. A state law claim against an innovator alleging inadequate warnings in its package 
insert is generally not preempted by federal law (FDA’s approval of the labeling in ques-
tion) because the innovator has both the obligation and the legal authority to revise its 
labeling unilaterally to reflect new safety information. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 
(2009). Such a claim is generally preempted when brought against a generic company, 
however, because the drug statute requires a generic drug’s labeling to be the same as the 
labeling of its reference drug and FDA does not permit generic companies to make unilat-
eral changes to their labeling. Pliva v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604, 613-23 (2011). The biologic 
statute does not require a biosimilar biologic’s labeling to be the same as the labeling of its 
reference product, nor has FDA published a regulation to that effect. This eliminates most 
of the Pliva rationale for finding preemption. But the agency has apparently required the 
labeling to be essentially the same, and it is not clear whether biosimilar applicants will be 
allowed to make unilateral safety–related labeling changes. FDA has said that the regula-
tion governing changes to approved biologics applies to biosimilars, but it may take the 
view that unilateral safety–related changes are not appropriate. 21 C.F.R. § 601.12 (2016); 
FDA DRAFT LABELING GUIDANCE, supra note 112, at 5. If FDA decides to permit these 
changes, the Pliva case would clearly not apply, and there would be no preemption. 
 116. E.g., Jaimy Lee, Sandoz: Zarxio Marketing to Be Similar to a Branded-Drug 
Launch, MM&M (Sept. 3, 2015), http://www.mmm-online.com/campaigns/sandoz-zarxio-
marketing-to-be-similar-to-a-branded-drug-launch/article/436778/ [https://perma.cc/7GWF-
K44T] (“The approach for marketing biosimilars is much closer to the approach for a 
branded product than that of generic medicine, and as such Sandoz has a fully integrated 
commercial organization behind the launch of Zarxio.” (quoting Leslie Pott, Vice President 
of Communications for Sandoz)).  
 117. FDA Q&A GUIDANCE, supra note 68, at 7, 12. Nor is a biosimilar applicant re-
quired to seek approval of every reference product presentation. Id. at 7. For instance, 
Neupogen is available in both vials and pre-filled syringes, but Sandoz sought approval 
of Zarxio only in pre-filled syringes. Sue Sutter, Biosimilar but Different: Zarxio, 
Neupogen Diverge on Syringes, Vials, PINK SHEET (Mar. 16, 2015), 
https://pink.pharmaintelligence.informa.com/PS056727/Biosimilar-But-Different-
emZarxioem-emNeupogenem-Diverge-On-Syringes-Vials [https://perma.cc/7LPQ-BERZ]. 
 118. FDA Q&A GUIDANCE, supra note 68, at 6-7.  
 119. 42 U.S.C. § 262(i) (2012) (defining biosimilar). 
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ing—and therefore describe the innovator’s studies—may further 
limit the biosimilar applicant’s promotional options. The agency’s 
regulations require that prescription drug promotional materials be 
consistent with the applicable package insert,120 which may preclude 
promotion on the basis of data described only in the biosimilar appli-
cation. The biosimilar industry has pressed FDA to “find a way” for 
biosimilar applicants to promote their products on the basis of their 
own trials,121 and recent developments in First Amendment jurispru-
dence may give some of them resolve to make these off-label claims 
despite agency rules.122 Individual firms may vary in their willing-
ness to test the boundaries of the First Amendment, however, and 
promotional strategies may vary and evolve. 
 (b)   Financial Considerations 
 Traditional innovator-style advertising and promotion, focusing on 
product features and clinical differences, are unlikely to drive biosim-
ilar market penetration. What remains, for the most part, may be 
price competition and the related considerations of coverage and re-
imbursement. Put another way, the statute’s approach of forcing du-
plication—the lack of a suitability petition option or hybrid applica-
tion pathway—may be central to ensuring robust price competition. 
That said, the high cost associated today with developing and launch-
ing a biosimilar may mean that discounts are modest in the early 
years.123 The small number of biosimilar applications for each refer-
ence product could have the same effect, limiting the price competi-
tion and discounting in the early years. If the premarket burden and 
risk vary by product type, discounts may vary, and market penetra-
tion could vary correspondingly. And as the burden and risk decline 
                                                                                                                  
 120. 21 C.F.R. § 201.100(d)(2) (2017).  
 121. Sue Sutter, Biosimilars’ Generic-Style Labeling Limits Data Promotion, Companies 
Say, PINK SHEET (May 25, 2015, 12:01 AM), https://pink.pharmamedtechbi.com/PS056882/ 
Biosimilars-Genericstyle-Labeling-Limits-Data-Promotion-Companies-Say [https://perma.cc/ 
765N-5E89] (noting that Hospira and Amgen argue that “being able to discuss the data underly-
ing approved biosimilars will be critical to building public support for the products”).  
 122. See, e.g., United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012) (vacating mis-
branding conviction of a pharmaceutical sales representative that was based on his having 
promoted Xyrem® (sodium oxybate) for unapproved uses using speech that was truthful 
and non-misleading); Amarin v. FDA, 106 F. Supp. 3d 196 (D.D.C.  2015) (finding manufac-
turer likely to succeed on the merits of argument that FDA’s threat to bring misbranding 
action for truthful statements promoting Vascepa® (icosapent ethyl) for an unapproved use 
impermissible burdens its First Amendment rights).  
 123. E.g., Ben Hirschler, Novartis Launches First U.S. ‘Biosimilar’ Drug at 15 Percent 
Discount, REUTERS (Sept. 3, 2015, 8:13 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-novartis-
drug-idUSKCN0R30C220150903 [https://perma.cc/68BH-9RNL]; Nicholas Florko, Remi-
cade Biosimilar to Launch in November, 15% Cheaper Than Innovator, 
INSIDEHEALTHPOLICY (Oct. 17, 2016). 
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over time, discounting and therefore market penetration could in-
crease. 
 Coverage and reimbursement for biologics and biosimilars is com-
plex and evolving, making it difficult to offer anything more than ini-
tial impressions about their influence on market penetration. But 
several points stand out. First, adoption of “specialty pharmacy” ar-
rangements may be a way for payers to invoke traditional cost con-
tainment strategies, driving market penetration of biosimilars. Sec-
ond, these arrangements are complex and involve parties with misa-
ligned interests, which may lead to practices that might otherwise 
attract criticism—like distribution restrictions and price increases—
but that in this context, counterintuitively achieve cost savings for 
the healthcare system. Third, under the federal Medicare program, 
at least for physician-administered products, it may be impossible for 
biosimilar applicants to compete with each other on any basis, in-
cluding price. 
 Generally speaking, a patient’s prescription medicine is covered 
under either her medical benefit or her pharmacy benefit.124 Typical-
ly, when a medicine is self-administered, it is dispensed by a phar-
macy and covered under the pharmacy benefit.125 When it is adminis-
tered in a physician’s office or other outpatient facility, it is ordinari-
ly covered instead under the medical benefit.126 Biologics tend to be 
administered by physicians and, thus, are more likely to be covered 
by the medical benefit. The emergence of “specialty pharmacies,” 
however, along with creative dispensing practices, may make it pos-
sible for payers to move biologics to the pharmacy benefit. 
 The phrase “specialty pharmaceutical” (or “specialty medicine”) 
has no legal significance, but various entities in the healthcare deliv-
ery and finance systems—manufacturers, insurance companies, 
pharmacies, and providers—use it to describe medicines that share 
certain characteristics and that they handle or manage differently 
from others.127 Specialty medicines are typically complex products, 
                                                                                                                  
 124. See, e.g., ROBERT NAVARRO & RUSTY HAILEY, Overview of Prescription Drug Bene-
fits in Managed Care, in MANAGED CARE PHARMACY PRACTICE 17, 20 (2009). Medicines 
administered in the inpatient setting, for instance in connection with surgery, are usually 
reimbursed as part of the medical procedure in question. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. For representative definitions, see Specialty Pharmaceuticals: Facts and Figures, 
PHARMACEUTICAL COMMERCE (Dec. 27, 2012), http://pharmaceuticalcommerce.com/special-
report/specialty-pharmaceuticals-facts-and-figures/ [https://perma.cc/3YLE-5K5N]; ACAD. 
OF MANAGED CARE PHARMACY, THE AMCP FORMAT FOR FORMULARY SUBMISSIONS VERSION 
3.1 20 (2012); Adam J. Fein, Defining Specialty Pharmacy, DRUG CHANNELS (Feb. 5, 2013), 
http://www.drugchannels.net/2013/02/defining-specialty-pharmacy.html [https://perma.cc/ 
4DA7-7X4V]; Ian Spatz & Nancy McGee, Specialty Pharmaceuticals, HEALTHAFF. (Nov. 25, 
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often biotechnology-derived and difficult to manufacture. They may 
require temperature–controlled (cold-chain) shipping and storage, 
and they may require special handling until the moment of admin-
istration. Most are for serious or chronic conditions, many are diffi-
cult to administer, and many have complex side effect profiles. They 
might require prescriber, pharmacist, or patient education and con-
tinual patient monitoring. Many are subject to use or distribution 
restrictions imposed by FDA.128 Others are subject to distribution re-
strictions adopted voluntarily by their manufacturers due to the need 
for cold-chain shipping, perhaps, or in order to reduce the risk of 
counterfeiting.129 
 Some physician-administered biologics may be shifted to the 
pharmacy benefit through use of specialty medicine distributing and 
dispensing arrangements. In this scenario, the biologic is “dispensed” 
by a “specialty pharmacy” for subsequent physician administration.130 
                                                                                                                  
2013), http://www.healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief.php?brief_id=103 [https://perma.cc/ 
7C55-T7UY]; Robert C. McDonald, Managing the Intersection of Medical and Pharmacy  
Benefits, 14 SUPPLEMENT TO J. MANAGED CARE PHARMACY  4, S8 (May 2008), 
http://www.amcp.org/data/jmcp/JMCPSupp_S7-S11.pdf [https://perma.cc/QQW3-RRE2]; Jack 
McCain, Connecting Patients with Specialty Products: Distribution Models for Biologics 
and Other Specialty Pharmaceutical Products, 9 BIOTECH. HEALTHCARE 8 (2012), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3411231/pdf/bh0902008.pdf [hereinafter 
McCain, Distribution Models for Biologics and Other Specialty Pharmaceutical Products]; 
Jack McCain, Connecting Patients with Specialty Products: The Future of Specialty Drug 
Distribution, 9 BIOTECH. HEALTHCARE 13 (2012), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/ 
23091429 [https://perma.cc/AWJ7-D3QE] [hereinafter McCain, The Future of Specialty 
Drug Distribution]. 
 128. For instance, Tysabri® (natalizumab) is often considered a specialty pharmaceuti-
cal. Tysabri is approved for treatment of multiple sclerosis but increases the risk of pro-
gressive multifocal leukoencephalopathy, an opportunistic viral infection of the brain that 
usually leads to death or severe disability. One’s risk increases with longer treatment du-
ration, prior immunosuppressant use, and the presence of certain antibodies. FDA has 
required the sponsor to adopt a Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy (REMS) that 
permits dispensing only by specially certified pharmacies and infusion sites.  
See REMS: BLA 125104, http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/rems/index.cfm?event= 
IndvRemsDetails.page&REMS=63 [https://perma.cc/CFW7-C9JY]; see also 21 U.S.C. § 355-1 
(2012) (authorizing FDA to impose REMS). 
 129. FDA may only require six types of restriction in a REMS: special training or cre-
dentials for prescribers, special certification for pharmacies, restricted dispensing loca-
tions, laboratory or related testing of patients, patient monitoring, and patient registries. 
21 U.S.C. § 355-1(f)(3) (2007-08). Genentech has placed non-REMS restrictions on Avastin 
(bevacizumab) due to concerns about counterfeiting. Physician offices may obtain the bio-
logic from only a few specialty distributors, and hospitals may obtain it from only a few 
wholesalers. The distributors and wholesalers have agreed not to distribute further to sec-
ondary wholesalers. See McCain, The Future of Specialty Drug Distribution, supra note 127. 
 130. Specialty pharmacies often have specialized storage and handling capabilities and 
expertise, as well as familiarity with distribution restrictions. They sometimes offer special 
programs and support for patients with chronic or rare conditions, perhaps partnering with 
treatment providers in an effort to improve outcomes; they might offer, for example, pack-
aging that promotes adherence to therapy and frequent personalized contact with the pa-
tients. E.g., ACAD. OF MANAGED CARE PHARMACY, supra note 127, at 35. 
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Procedures known in the industry as “white bagging” and “brown 
bagging” physically transfer the dispensed medicine from the special-
ty pharmacy to the relevant physician’s office or outpatient facility.131 
This medicine would be reimbursed under the patient’s pharmacy 
benefit. Use of the pharmacy benefit in turn facilitates use of conven-
tional cost-management tools, such as formulary management, prior 
authorization requirements, and copayments (fixed amounts) or coin-
surance (percentages).132 When FDA approved Zarxio, the largest 
pharmacy benefit manager (PBM) in the country pushed its clients 
(payers) to adopt a specialty pharmacy arrangement for both 
Neupogen and Zarxio.133 This permitted reimbursement through the 
pharmacy benefit and allowed the PBM to use prior authorization 
and formulary exclusion to promote use of Zarxio instead of 
Neupogen.134 The “specialty pharmacy” concept is gaining a foothold 
in the healthcare finance and delivery system and has the potential 
to drive biosimilar market penetration by facilitating adoption of 
pharmacy benefit cost-management tools. 
 Specialty pharmacy is an evolving and complicated area, however, 
involving healthcare delivery and finance system stakeholders that 
may have unexpected or conflicting interests or that may make deci-
sions that seem counter-intuitive. Here is an example of conflicting 
interests: a payer urging the specialty pharmacy arrangement to 
achieve cost savings might face opposition from larger physician of-
fices, which may prefer that specialty medicines remain on the medi-
cal benefit, which provides them with more revenue.135 White and 
                                                                                                                  
 131. White bagging generally involves dispensing by a pharmacy and shipment to the 
provider in time for treatment. Brown bagging generally involves dispensing by a pharma-
cy directly to the patient, who brings it to the physician’s office at the time of treatment. 
See generally McCain, Distribution Models for Biologics and Other Specialty Pharmaceuti-
cal Products, supra note 127. 
 132. See PHARM. STRATEGIES GROUP, UNDERSTANDING SPECIALTY PHARMACY 
MANAGEMENT AND COST CONTROL 6-7 (2010).  
 133. A pharmacy benefit manager administers pharmacy benefit programs, typically 
for the entities that ultimately pay for the medicines (e.g., insurance companies or corpora-
tions). Among other things, a pharmacy benefit manager assists with the plan design, de-
velops and maintains the formulary, negotiates with pharmacies and manufacturers, and 
processes claims. Essentially, a pharmacy benefit manager acts as an intermediary be-
tween the payer and everyone else in the healthcare system. See generally Joanna Shep-
herd, The Fox Guarding the Henhouse: The Regulation of Pharmacy Benefit Managers by a 
Market Adversary, 9 N.W. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 1, 2-4 (2013). 
 134. See Cathy Kelly, PBM Wants Filgrastim in Pharmacy Benefit to Push Biosimilar 
Use, PINK SHEET (Mar. 16, 2015), https://pink.pharmaintelligence.informa.com/PS056713/ 
PBM-Wants-Filgrastim-In-Pharmacy-Benefit-To-Push-Biosimilar-Use [https://perma.cc/ 
EY2F-ZK9T].  
 135. The leverage of any particular physician office may depend on the medicine, the 
alternatives in the class, and the office’s specialty. Brand-loyalty, which varies by physi-
cian specialty, could also prompt physicians to push back on—or ignore—particular cost-
management strategies. Allergists are thought to be more price-sensitive, for example, and 
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brown bagging for the pharmacy benefit denies physicians the pay-
ment they would otherwise receive under the medical benefit as a 
result of the “buy and bill” approach.136 Physicians in smaller practic-
es may prefer white and brown bagging for the pharmacy benefit, 
however, because it reduces their financial risk.137 
 Two further examples illustrate unexpected decisions with coun-
ter-intuitive cost-saving outcomes. First, after moving an expensive 
specialty medicine to the pharmacy benefit, a payer—that is, neither 
FDA nor the innovator—might impose distribution restrictions, limit-
ing the supply chain to both specialty pharmacies and specialty dis-
tributors. These restrictions may increase cost savings for the 
healthcare finance system because limiting the number of pharma-
cies that may distribute (and thus purchase) a medicine allows the 
payer to consolidate its purchasing power.138 Second, price increases 
may actually increase cost savings for the healthcare finance system: 
Sandoz found that specialty pharmacy arrangements forced it to in-
crease the price of its follow-on protein product, Omnitrope®, in order 
to achieve market penetration.139 Distribution restrictions and price 
increases, sometimes reflexively assumed to be harmful, may actual-
ly turn out to be a path to cost savings. 
 The rules governing coverage and reimbursement of biosimilar 
biologics under government health insurance programs are different. 
The Medicare program, which will be particularly relevant for biolog-
ics that are heavily prescribed to older populations, has a different 
incentive structure. To begin with, the Medicare Part B reimburse-
                                                                                                                  
rheumatologists demonstrate greater levels of brand loyalty. See Henry Grabowski et al., 
Biosimilars, in ENCYC. OF HEALTH ECON. 86, 92-93 (2016); see also Sue Sutter, Biosimilar Pre-
scribing Decisions May Depend Upon Disease State, PINK SHEET (Oct. 24, 2016), 
https://pink.pharmamedtechbi.com/PS119377/cBiosimilar-Prescribing-Decisions-May-Depend-Upon-
Disease-State [https://perma.cc/SHD7-JDBH] (quoting official from Express Scripts Holding Co. 
for proposition that physicians may be more likely to prescribe a biosimilar for inflammatory 
conditions than for cancer). 
 136. Under the “buy and bill” approach, the physician purchases the drugs, manages 
an inventory, administers the drugs, and submits claims. See Tim Casey, Alternative Dis-
tribution Strategies: “Buy and Bill” and “White Bagging”, FIRST REPORT: MANAGED CARE 
(Jan. 21, 2014). In addition to more revenue, the buy and bill approach may make it easier 
to change medications and adjust dosing regimens. 
 137. Id. 
 138. See NAVARRO & HAILEY, supra note 124, at 32; Ian Spatz & Nancy McGee, supra 
note 127, at 1, 3. 
 139. See Sue Sutter, Biosimilar Pricing: Sandoz Vows Not to Make Omnitrope ‘Mistake’ 
with Filgrastim, PINK SHEET (Dec. 22, 2014), https://pink.pharmamedtechbi.com/PS056542/ 
Biosimilar-Pricing-Sandoz-Vows-Not-To-Make-emOmnitropeem-Mistake-With-Filgrastim 
[https://perma.cc/GQ55-KE43] (quoting Sandoz executive that the company sold Omnitrope 
through specialty pharmacies and “because they make a profit based on a percentage of the 
sales price of the drug, we had a lousy experience in selling the product because we priced it 
too low, and we had to increase the price to sell the product” (emphasis added)). 
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ment rules may remove any incentive for a prescriber administering 
a biologic in an outpatient setting to select the reference product in-
stead of the biosimilar.140 Under Part B, a provider generally pays for 
medicine and then seeks reimbursement from patient insurance. Re-
imbursement is typically 106% of the manufacturer’s average sales 
price (ASP).141 The 6% add-on is viewed as payment for the provider’s 
resource costs and overhead. In 2010, Congress specified that Part B 
reimbursement for a biosimilar should be 100% of the biosimilar’s 
ASP plus 6% of the reference product’s ASP. In other words, the 6% 
add-on, the payment to the provider for services and overhead, must 
be the same for the biosimilar product and the reference product.142 
This was intended to eliminate the financial incentive to prescribe 
the product with the higher ASP, typically the reference product.143 
 In addition, Medicare will provide the same amount in reim-
bursement for every biosimilar to the same reference product. This 
same-amount rule results from a decision relating to the codes as-
signed to biosimilars for reimbursement purposes. Items and services 
provided in the delivery of healthcare are assigned “Healthcare 
Common Procedure Coding System” codes, or HCPCS codes. Most 
drugs receive a “J-code,” and an innovative drug without any generic 
equivalents generally receives a unique J-code. Once generic copies of 
that drug are approved, however, the generics and reference product 
are grouped together. A provider receives the same amount in reim-
bursement under Part B for each drug in the same J-code: the vol-
ume weighted average ASP for the code plus 6%.144 This grouping and 
formula provide an incentive for providers to use the generic drug, 
                                                                                                                  
 140. Medicare Part B generally covers services received in an outpatient clinical or 
hospital outpatient setting, as well as the medicines involved. Inpatient services, and the 
medicines involved, are usually covered under Part A. See generally PATRICIA A. DAVIS ET 
AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40425, MEDICARE PRIMER (Sept. 2014) 
 141. Because of sequestration (federal spending cuts scheduled to be in effect through 
2021), at the time of writing Medicare reimbursement was actually at ASP plus 4.3%. See 
Alex Brill & Brett Leitner, Sequestration’s Uniform Medicare Cut Will Yield Disparate 
Impacts Across Providers, HEALTH LAW. (June 11, 2013), http://www.aei.org/publication/ 
sequestrations-uniform-medicare-cut-will-yield-disparate-impacts-across-providers/ 
[https://perma.cc/E6DU-QF73]. 
 142. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 3139, 124 
Stat. 439-40 (2010); 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-3a(b)(8) (2012).  
 143. See Anna Kraus, Esther Scherb & Stefanie Doebler, CMS Releases New Reimburse-
ment Guidance for Biosimilars, NAT’L L. REV. (Apr. 7, 2015), https://www.natlawreview.com/ 
article/cms-releases-new-reimbursement-guidance-biosimilars [https://perma.cc/E3TV-MXXT]; 
see also MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: IMPROVING 
INCENTIVES IN THE MEDICARE PROGRAM 124-30 (2009).  
 144. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
MEDICARE PAYMENTS FOR NEWLY AVAILABLE GENERIC DRUGS 2-3 (2015). 
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assuming its acquisition costs are lower.145 Because a biosimilar bio-
logic is not analogous to a generic drug, however, CMS is not placing 
biosimilars in the same J-code as their reference products. That said, 
all of the products biosimilar to a particular reference product will be 
placed together within the same J-code. In other words, the reference 
product will have one J-code, and its biosimilars will be lumped to-
gether in a separate J-code. CMS also intends to use a single ASP for 
all biosimilars lumped together in one code.146 The bottom line is that 
under current policy, Medicare reimburses all biosimilars to the same 
reference product equally, even if those biosimilars are not approved 
for the same indications or differ in other ways, and even if their ac-
quisition costs for providers are different. This will make it difficult, 
if not impossible, for biosimilar applicants to differentiate their prod-
ucts in the marketplace. 
 Some biosimilars will be covered instead under Medicare Part D, 
which provides insurance coverage for biologics that do not meet the 
Part B coverage criteria and are generally dispensed by pharmacies. 
Part D is administered by private companies (Part D sponsors) sub-
ject to CMS oversight, including oversight with respect to formulary 
review and management. Part D sponsors may add biosimilars to 
their formularies at any time, and removal of the corresponding ref-
erence product will be permitted on a case-by-case basis if the revised 
formulary continues to meet CMS standards.147 In the Part D scheme, 
biosimilars are both like and unlike innovative products. For in-
stance, each therapeutic category and class of Part D drugs must con-
tain at least two drugs “that are not therapeutically equivalent and 
bioequivalent.”148 This precludes a category and class from compris-
ing only an innovative drug and its generic equivalents. CMS is 
treating biosimilars like generic drugs for purposes of this require-
ment, even though a biosimilar is not “therapeutically equivalent” 
                                                                                                                  
 145. Henry Grabowski et al., Implementation of the Biosimilar Pathway: Economic and 
Policy Issues, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 511, 538 (2011). 
 146. Medicare Program; Revisions to Payment Policies Under the Physician Fee 
Schedule and Other Revisions to Part B for CY 2016, 80 Fed. Reg. 70,886, 71,100-01 (Nov. 
16, 2015) (to be codified at 42 CFR pts. 405, 410, 411, et al.) (final rule for physician fee 
schedule for CY 2016).  In July 2017, CMS solicited comments on the new payment policy 
and signaled that it might now be open to individual J-codes for biosimilars. Medicare Pro-
gram; Revisions to Payment Policies Under the Physician Fee Schedule and Other Revi-
sions to Part B for CY 2018; Medicare Shared Savings Program Requirements; and Medi-
care Diabetes Prevention Program, 82 Fed. Reg. 33,950 (July 21, 2017) (to be codified at 42 
C.F.R. pts. 405, 410, 414, 424, and 425). 
 147. Memorandum from CMS on the Part D Requirements for Biosimilar Follow-On Bio-
logical Products to Part D Sponsors (Mar. 30, 2015) [hereinafter Part D Guidance] (citing 
Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit Manual, ch. 6, § 30.1.5). The Part D Guidance does not 
apply to interchangeable biologics, which presumably the agency will address at a later date. 
 148. 42 C.F.R. § 423.120(b)(2) (2016). 
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and “bioequivalent” to its reference product. Thus, it is not sufficient 
simply to make a reference product and its biosimilar available.149 At 
the same time, according to CMS, biosimilars should be treated like 
innovative products for reimbursement purposes.150 Thus, for in-
stance, a subscriber with a low-income subsidy will be responsible for 
the copayment associated with innovative products, which is higher 
than a generic copayment. But unlike innovative products, biosimi-
lars are not subject to the requirement of a manufacturer discount 
while beneficiaries are in the Part D coverage gap.151 This could make 
the biosimilar more expensive for patients than its reference product, 
affecting patient willingness to remain on the biosimilar while in the 
gap.152 
 State Medicaid plans are likely to employ many of the same cost 
management techniques as Medicare Part D sponsors and private 
health plans in order to further biosimilar adoption. All states cur-
rently elect to include prescription drug benefits as part of their Med-
icaid benefit packages.153 Like other payer plans, state Medicaid 
plans include formularies, set and managed by formulary commit-
tees, which take into account many of the same considerations as 
other formulary committees. Following approval of the first biosimi-
lar, CMS issued guidance to the states describing the launch of bio-
similar products as “a unique opportunity to achieve measurable cost 
savings and greater beneficiary access to expensive therapeutic 
treatments for chronic conditions.”154 It recommended that states use 
                                                                                                                  
 149. Part D Guidance, supra note 147. 
 150. Id. (a “generic drug” is a drug for which an application under section 505(j) of the 
FDCA has been approved (citing 42 C.F.R. § 423.4 (2015)); 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(k)(7)(A)(i) 
(2012) (a multiple-source or multi-source drug is a drug for which there are approved ther-
apeutic equivalents).  
 151. The Medicare Part D benefit has a “coverage gap” during which beneficiaries are 
entirely responsible for the cost of their prescription drugs. In 2010, Congress created a 
Coverage Gap Discount Program to help close the gap. The Patient Protection and Afforda-
ble Care Act of 2010 § 3301, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010); Health Care and 
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, §1101, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010). 
 152. See Cathy Kelly, Biosimilar Costs Could Exceed Brands in Part D Coverage Gap, 
PINK SHEET DAILY (Apr. 7, 2015), https://pink.pharmamedtechbi.com/PS078446/Biosimilar-
Costs-Could-Exceed-Brands-In-Part-D-Coverage-Gap [https://perma.cc/9THH-TN4L]. 
 153. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., MEDICAID  
REBATES FOR PHYSICIAN-ADMINISTERED DRUGS (2004), https://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-
03-02-00660.pdf [https://perma.cc/CD27-RWYB]; OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., STATES’ COLLECTION OF MEDICAID REBATES FOR  
PHYSICIAN-ADMINISTERED DRUGS (2011), https://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-03-09-
00410.pdf [https://perma.cc/R7SD-YD7Z].  
 154. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
MEDICAID DRUG REBATE PROGRAM NOTICE RELEASE NO. 92: BIOSIMILARS AND THE 
MEDICAID DRUG REBATE PROGRAM (2015). Because the federal government pays states a 
percentage of their program expenditures, the federal government has an interest in mech-
anisms that reduce costs for covered medicines. In order for federal funds to be provided for 
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available cost-management tools (such as prior authorization re-
quirements and preferred drug lists) to steer patients towards bio-
similars.155 CMS also pointed out that “reminding” physicians how to 
prescribe biosimilars, because they are not substitutable, “is im-
portant to encourage and maximize their use.”156 
 (c)   Other Factors—Immunogenicity and Naming 
 Although financial considerations are likely to be paramount, con-
cerns about immunogenicity might affect decisions made by formu-
laries, physicians, and other decision-makers and therefore affect 
market penetration. FDA has raised the concern that switching be-
tween biologics made by different companies might exacerbate or 
change immunogenic responses to one or the other.157 An inter-
changeability determination requires studies addressing this very 
question. In the absence of those studies, some may choose biosimi-
lars for treatment-naïve patients (where no switch of proteins is in-
volved) but not for established patients (where a switch would be 
necessary).158 If a biosimilar applicant includes a cross-over from the 
reference product to the biosimilar in one of its clinical trials for ini-
tial biosimilar licensure,159 the resulting data may persuade some de-
                                                                                                                  
its outpatient drugs, the manufacturer must have entered into an agreement to pay re-
bates to the states. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(a) (2012). 
 155. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 154, at 2. Subject to some 
exceptions, however, if the manufacturer has signed the National Rebate Agreement, the 
state plan must permit coverage of a drug excluded from the formulary, through a prior 
authorization program. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(d)(4)(E) (2012). That is, exclusion from the 
formulary does not lead to lack of coverage. 
 156. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 154, at 2. 
 157. E.g., Biosimilars Implementation: Hearing on the BPCI Act Before the S. Sub-
comm. on Primary Health & Retirement Sec., 114th Cong. (Sep. 17, 2015) [hereinafter Bio-
similars Implementation Hearing] (statement of Dr. Woodcock, Director, Center for Drug 
Evaluation and Research) (“The question is would [continued switching] cause additional 
harm because of unexpected immune responses. Because unlike most of our small molecule 
drugs, the body recognizes these large protein molecules that are biosimilars and often, 
will make, in some people, will make an immune response. And what the concern has been 
is that this continued switching could raise that immunity—sort of provide a booster effect 
and cause untoward effects.”).  
 158. TUFTS CTR., supra note 49, at 3-4 (noting that “one-third of physicians surveyed 
said they would be unlikely to switch an existing patient from an originator biologic to a 
biosimilar,” and although “[a]ll payers said they would recommend use of biosimilars for 
new patients” only “75% of payer respondents said they would likely recommend therapeu-
tic switching of biosimilars”).  
 159. For instance, Amgen’s application for Amjevita included data from a subset of 
subjects with plaque psoriasis who underwent a single transition from Humira to Amjevita 
at week 16. These subjects were compared with subjects who had been randomized to 
Humira in the first instance and remained on Humira after week 16. Amgen explained in 
its briefing materials that the purpose of the analysis was to “establish safety, efficacy, and 
immunogenicity following a single physician–supervised transition” from Humira to Am-
jevita. AMGEN, BIOLOGICS LICENSE APPLICATION FOR ABP 501 13 (2016). See Amgen, 
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cisionmakers to switch established patients to the biosimilar in ques-
tion.160 Others may wait for observational data from therapeutic in-
terchange. Still others may wait until FDA starts to grant inter-
changeability determinations, and others might wait for an inter-
changeability determination for the product in question. The impact 
of unanswered immunogenicity questions on the market uptake of 
any particular biosimilar may depend in part on whether its primary 
uses are acute, short-term, or chronic conditions (because a product 
for chronic conditions raises the switching issue), the sensitivity of 
the particular patient population to immunogenic reactions,161 and 
how many new (naïve) patients are diagnosed each year. 
 FTC staff have also argued that FDA’s decision to give biologics 
distinctive nonproprietary names will affect biosimilar market pene-
tration.162 In colloquial terms, the nonproprietary name is the lower-
case word that appears in parenthesis after the brand name: inflixi-
                                                                                                                  
Comment Letter on the Transparent Labeling of Biosimilars 4 (July 20, 2015) (“Parallel–
arm clinical studies that have a single transition from the reference product to the biosimi-
lar candidate are being conducted by some biosimilar manufacturers.”). 
 160. The Executive Director for Scientific Affairs at Sandoz, which is developing bio-
similars, has explained that single switch data are valuable because of the “reassurance” 
they provide to patients about the idea of switching from the reference product to the bio-
similar. Sue Sutter, Biosimilar Interchangeability: NOR–SWITCH–Type Study Not Enough for 
US FDA, PINK SHEET (Nov. 1, 2016), https://pink.pharmamedtechbi.com/PS119433/Biosimilar-
Interchangeability-NORSWITCHType-Study-Not-Enough-For-US-FDA [https://perma.cc/3XJV-
VZ5U]. The results of the crossover should be publicly available even though not included 
in the package insert. The company may announce them at professional conferences and in 
press releases; it could publish them in a scientific journal; the data may be discussed at 
the advisory committee meeting considering the biosimilar application; and FDA’s website 
must include the memoranda prepared by the agency reviewers. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(l) 
(2012). Cf. FDA, CROSS-DISCIPLINE TEAM LEADER REVIEW: BLA 125544, at 26-27 (Apr. 5, 
2016), http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/nda/2016/125544Orig1s000CrossR.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7CD7-3ZCW] (“Further, because the objectives of a 351(k) application are 
to establish biosimilarity and not to independently establish safety [or] effectiveness of the 
product, inclusion in the proposed labeling of the [REDACTED] is not warranted and will 
not be included. Of note, these product–specific data for [Inflectra] were presented at the 
Arthritis Advisory Committee on February 9, 2016 and FDA’s review of these data will be 
publicly available after licensure as part of the FDA ‘action package’ for the public to re-
view.”). 
 161. Patient-specific factors that can affect immunogenic response include concomitant 
medications, general immunologic status, age, prior exposure to the protein or structurally 
similar proteins, and genetic factors. FDA IMMUNOGENICITY GUIDANCE, supra note 25, at 
9-12. 
 162. Federal Trade Commission, Comment Letter on the Nonproprietary Naming of 
Biological Products 2 (Oct. 27, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/ 
advocacy_documents/ftc-staff-comment-submitted-food-drug-administration-response-fdas-
request-comments-its-guidance/151028fdabiosimilar.pdf [https://perma.cc/4TSN-3K4R] 
(arguing that the proposal could “result in physicians incorrectly believing that biosimilars’ 
drug substances differ in clinically meaningful ways” and thereby “deter physicians from 
prescribing biosimilars, thus impeding the development of biosimilar markets and competi-
tion”).  
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mab for Remicade, to give an example, and fluoxetine for Prozac.163 
FDA has proposed that all biologics, including innovative products, 
have distinct nonproprietary names, to ensure identification and ac-
curate attribution of emerging safety signals.164 Rapid and accurate 
attribution of adverse events is thought essential given the risk of 
immunogenicity and the possibility that either: (1) differences be-
tween the reference product and biosimilar may not emerge during 
premarket testing due to the rareness or latency period of the immu-
nogenic reaction in question, or (2) one or the other company may 
make a manufacturing change that unexpectedly triggers an immune 
reaction.165 Thus, every biological product will have a nonproprietary 
name that includes a suffix comprising four lowercase letters.166 Alt-
                                                                                                                  
 163. The nonproprietary name is also called the “established name” or, in the case of a 
biologic, the “proper name.” See 21 U.S.C. § 352(e) (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 262(a)(1) (2012); 21 
C.F.R. § 610.62 (2016). The FDCA requires use of the nonproprietary name in drug labels 
and labeling, and since the late 1960s, FDA has accepted use of the “United States Adopted 
Name” (USAN) adopted by the USAN Council, a private group that includes members from 
FDA, the American Medical Association, and the United States Pharmacopoeia. See USAN 
HANDBOOK 12 (5th ed. 1999); Designated Names; Revocation of List of Official Names of 
Drugs, 49 Fed. Reg. 37,574 (Sept. 25, 1984) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 299). A name 
designated by FDA through rulemaking, however, takes precedence over a USAN. 21 
U.S.C. §§ 352(e), 358. The USAN and established name should not be confused with the 
international nonproprietary name (INN) assigned by the World Health Organization 
(WHO) to pharmaceutical substances and active ingredients, although with rare exceptions 
(e.g., acetaminophen / paracetamol) the names are identical. 
 164. See Nonproprietary Naming of Biological Products; Draft Guidance for Industry; 
Availability, 80 Fed. Reg. 52,296-97 (Aug. 28, 2015). The agency also believes distinct names 
will also minimize “inadvertent substitution,” meaning “unintended alternating or switching 
of biological products that have not been determined by FDA to be interchangeable.” 
 165. FDA, NONPROPRIETARY NAMING OF BIOLOGICAL PRODUCTS: GUIDANCE FOR 
INDUSTRY 1 (2015).  
 166. 80 Fed. Reg. at 52,296. Some have proposed relying on brand names or on the 
National Drug Code (NDC) number, which captures the manufacturer, strength, dosage 
form, formulation, and package (form or size) of a product. FDA appears to have rejected 
both. Although biosimilars are likely to have brand names, health care providers may use 
nonproprietary names when prescribing and ordering products, and pharmacovigilance 
systems often do not require inclusion of brand names. The NDC number is often omitted 
from adverse event reports or transcribed incorrectly. See generally Designation of Official 
Names and Proper Names for Certain Biological Products, 80 Fed. Reg. 52,224, 52,227 
(Aug. 28, 2015); see also Erika Lietzan et al., Biosimilar Naming: How Do Adverse Event 
Reporting Data Support the Need for Distinguishable Nonproprietary Names for Biosimi-
lars?, 3 FDLI’S FOOD & DRUG POL’Y FORUM 6 (Mar. 27, 2013) (finding extensive use of ref-
erence product brand names to report adverse events experienced with generic products); 
Part 15 Public Hearing on Approval Pathway for Biosimilar and Interchangeable Biological 
Products Before FDA, at 169 (Nov. 2, 2010) (statement of Dr. John K. Jenkins) (“[W]hile the 
[MedWatch] reporting system may include a field for NDC number, I think it’s very rare 
that we get that level of information . . . .”).  
  Although controversial, FDA’s approach is similar to an approach offered privately 
by the generic industry, and it generally aligns with World Health Organization recom-
mendations. Derrick Gingery, GPhA Gets Its Second Choice on Biosimilar Naming, PINK 
SHEET (Mar. 16, 2015), https://pink.pharmamedtechbi.com/PS056721/GPhA-Gets-Its-Second-
Choice-On-Biosimilar-Naming [https://perma.cc/87LF-PG4U] (“[T]he trade group had actually 
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hough the FTC staff argue that resulting confusion may slow uptake 
biosimilars by deterring their usage, the case for confusion seems 
weak where two products share the same core name (e.g., “fil-
grastim”) and where the labeling of one states that it is a biosimilar 
of the other. It stands to reason that price considerations would pre-
vail in this scenario, especially where payers play a role in treatment 
selection. 
C.   The Arrival of Interchangeable Biologics 
 One of the most significant dynamic features of the biologic 
framework is the interchangeability determination. Although the bio-
logic statute permits a biosimilar applicant to seek an interchangea-
bility determination at the time of initial product approval, FDA has 
signaled that for now it expects applicants to proceed sequentially, 
beginning with biosimilarity.167 At the time of writing, the agency 
had issued no interchangeability determinations.168 But several im-
portant points stand out. 
 First, interchangeability determinations may be expensive for 
sponsors. In addition to meeting the standards for biosimilar licen-
sure, the sponsor must show: (1) that its product can be expected to 
produce the same clinical result as the reference product in any given 
                                                                                                                  
offered a close variant of the suffix naming idea to FDA during private meetings . . . .”); 
WHO, BIOLOGICAL QUALIFIER: AN INN PROPOSAL (2015), http://www.who.int/medicines/ 
services/inn/WHO_INN_BQ_proposal_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/CV4J-MAPU] (recom-
mending assignment of random alphabetic codes—four random consonants with or without 
a two digit checksum—to the active substance applicant by applicant, to be used in con-
junction with the product’s INN); see also Jordan Paradise, The Legal and Regulatory Sta-
tus of Biosimilars: How Product Naming and State Substitution Laws May Impact the 
United States Healthcare System, 41 AM. J. L. & MED. 49 (2015) (examining the debate 
surrounding WHO international non-proprietary names for biologics and asserting that the 
outcome of the debate will affect cost-savings, effective tracking and reporting of adverse 
events, and barriers to market entry); Joanna M. Shepherd, Biologic Drugs, Biosimilars, 
and Barriers to Entry, 25 HEALTH MATRIX 139, 152 (2015) (arguing that pioneers have 
“sought to extend their current monopoly” by advocating for distinguishable non-
proprietary names for biologics and by proposing bills in state legislatures “designed to 
impede the prescription of approved biosimilars in place of innovative biologics”). 
 167. FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: BIOSIMILARS: ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS AND 
ANSWERS REGARDING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BIOLOGICS PRICE COMPETITION AND 
INNOVATION ACT OF 2009, at 7 (draft) (2015) [hereinafter FDA ADDITIONAL Q&A 
GUIDANCE], http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/Guidances/UCM273001.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
MG59-Z97C] (stating that “[a]t this time, it would be difficult as a scientific matter” for an 
applicant to establish interchangeability in an original application). 
 168. By way of contrast, FDA was issuing A-ratings before Congress enacted the Hatch-
Waxman Amendments. The 1985 issue of the Orange Book was its sixth edition. FDA final-
ly issued draft guidance on interchangeability in January 2017. FDA, GUIDANCE FOR 
INDUSTRY, CONSIDERATIONS IN DEMONSTRATING INTERCHANGEABILITY WITH A  
REFERENCE PRODUCT (draft) (2017) [hereinafter FDA INTERCHANGEABILITY GUIDANCE], 
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidan
ces/UCM537135.pdf [https://perma.cc/24WG-C9BM]. 
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patient, and, (2) if its product is administered more than once to an 
individual, the risk of alternating or switching between the products 
is not greater than the risk of using the innovative product alone.169 
FDA has said little since enactment about what will be needed to 
demonstrate the absence of an increased risk due to alternating or 
switching between the products. Prior to enactment, FDA indicated 
that it would want clinical switching studies to demonstrate the ab-
sence of an increased risk due to alternating or switching between 
the products,170 and its recent draft guidance makes the same sugges-
tion.171 This could make interchangeability applications more expen-
sive to prepare than biosimilarity applications. This stands in sharp 
contrast to the drug framework, where the easier and cheaper appli-
cation—the ANDA—leads to the automatically substitutable product, 
and the harder and more expensive application—under section 
505(b)(2)—generally leads to a product that is not substitutable and 
can be differentiated in the marketplace.172 That said, as an institu-
tional matter FDA is likely to prefer the eventual development of a 
paradigm where interchangeability determinations do not require 
extensive and expensive clinical studies. 
 Second, interchangeability determinations may not affect market 
penetration. In the case of physician-administered biologics, which 
comprise the vast majority, payers may drive patients to biosimilars 
through formulary coverage and design decisions regardless of any 
interchangeability determination. An interchangeability determina-
tion might have persuasive power if the biologic were indicated for 
patients suffering from chronic conditions and if the healthcare pro-
vider or payer were hesitant to switch patients stabilized on the ref-
erence product. But this incremental value could decline over time as 
payers and healthcare providers grow comfortable with non-medical 
switching and if immunogenic reactions are rare. In the case of self-
                                                                                                                  
 169. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(4) (2012).  
 170. See Biosimilars Implementation Hearing, supra note 157; Letter from Frank M. 
Torti, M.D., M.P.H., Principal Deputy Comm’r and Chief Scientist, FDA, to Rep. Pallone, 
Chairman, H. Subcomm. on Health, Comm. on Energy and Commerce, at 9-10 (Sept. 2008) 
(stating that an interchangeability designation “would be based on, among other things, a 
showing of similar relevant structural characteristics between the two products, an under-
standing of the structure-function relationships, and clinical data evaluating the impact of 
switching patients from one product to the other”). 
 171. FDA INTERCHANGEABILITY GUIDANCE, supra note 168, at 9-16. 
 172. As a general rule, products approved pursuant to section 505(b)(2) could not be 
rated therapeutically equivalent. FDA grants therapeutic equivalence ratings if two drugs 
are pharmaceutically equivalent, which requires the same active ingredient, route of ad-
ministration, dosage form, and strength, and if they are bioequivalent. See supra Section 
III.A. The very differences that lead to clinical testing and use of the 505(b)(2) pathway—
such as tweaking the active ingredient—preclude a finding of pharmaceutical equivalence 
and therefore an A-rating. 
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administered biologics, payers may play a greater role in influencing 
market penetration through formulary design than would state 
pharmacy law through automatic substitution of interchangeable bio-
logics. Whether the biologic is physician-administered or self-
administered, if the healthcare provider or payer would select the 
biosimilar for the patient anyway, the interchangeability determina-
tion would not change the outcome and might not be worth the addi-
tional investment. 
 Third, although the statute offers exclusivity to the first applicant 
to demonstrate interchangeability, the market impact of this exclu-
sivity is unclear, and the lead time may not justify the investment. 
The first biologic found interchangeable with a particular reference 
product for any condition of use receives a period of exclusivity dur-
ing which no other biologic may be deemed interchangeable to that 
reference product for any condition of use.173 In the meantime, how-
ever, FDA may apparently continue to approve biologics that are bio-
similar to the same reference product. This is because the exclusivity 
provision prevents only interchangeability determinations; it does 
not prevent approval of biosimilars. So long as the agency expects 
interchangeability to be a sequential showing, there may be licensed 
biosimilars in the marketplace when the first sponsor demonstrates 
interchangeability, and additional biosimilars could launch during its 
exclusivity period. Moreover, even after the agency starts to license 
biosimilar biologics with immediate interchangeability determina-
tions, the sponsors of those products could face competition from bio-
similars during the exclusivity period. In either case, if interchange-
ability determinations add significant expense, if healthcare provid-
ers would select or payers would require use of the product even 
without the determination, and if payers would not absorb the cost of 
the determination, the period of time with exclusive interchangeabil-
ity status may not justify the investment.174 
                                                                                                                  
 173. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(6) (2012). This exclusivity lasts for a maximum of one year, and 
the statute includes termination dates that operate as de facto forfeiture provisions if the 
sponsor does not launch in a timely fashion. First, if the innovator did not bring a patent 
infringement suit in accordance with section 351(l)(6), the exclusivity will end eighteen 
months after the interchangeable biologic was licensed. Id. § 262(k)(6)(C)(ii). Second, if the 
innovator brings a patent infringement suit, the exclusivity will end on the earlier of: (1) 18 
months after a court decision or dismissal, or (2) 42 months after approval if the case is 
“still ongoing within” the 42-month period. Id. § 262(k)(6)(B)-(C).  
 174. See Derrick Gingery, Biosimilar Interchangeability May Be Losing Luster as Ap-
proval Goal, PINK SHEET (Sept. 13, 2016), https://pink.pharmamedtechbi.com/PS119121/ 
Biosimilar-Interchangeability-May-Be-Losing-Luster-As-Approval-Goal [https://perma.cc/ 
3EZE-HFHU] (quoting president and CEO of Momenta Pharmaceuticals, a biosimilar 
manufacturer, that “interchangeability cannot make up for late market entry,” that is, if 
biosimilar biologics have already been approved for the reference product, an interchange-
ability designation “isn’t going to help you much at all”). 
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 There is a great deal of uncertainty about interchangeability de-
terminations, including how quickly they will become possible, 
whether they will be achievable for some products but not others, 
whether the associated cost will translate into more expensive prod-
ucts, and whether they will actually affect market penetration. On 
the one hand, interchangeable biologics could ultimately become the 
default, with biosimilar biologics a relic of the initial years of statuto-
ry implementation. On the other hand, interchangeability determina-
tions could turn out to be mostly irrelevant and not worth the ex-
pense. The biosimilar industry does not have a uniform view on the 
value of interchangeability designations, perhaps due to differing re-
search and development plans as well as different business models, 
which makes it difficult to predict what will happen.175 
IV.   INNOVATION: FUNCTIONAL AND CONCEPTUAL  
SEPARATION OF PATENTS 
 Enactment of a pathway for approval of abbreviated biologic ap-
plications fundamentally changed the hundred-year-old framework 
governing biological medicines.176 It revolutionized how and on what 
terms biologic makers may compete in the marketplace, and it is 
equally likely to change when, how, and whether they innovate. As in 
the drug framework, the dimensions of competition and innovation 
should work synergistically; that is, a revolution in the competitive 
landscape will surely affect innovation decisions, and changes in in-
novation behaviors will surely affect the options for, if not the busi-
ness strategies of, potential competitors. Evaluating the impact of 
this groundbreaking legislation on social welfare—whether, how, and 
why it results in pro-competitive versus anti-competitive behavior in 
the marketplace, and whether, how, and why it discourages versus 
stimulates innovation—requires careful attention to the ways in 
which it departs from the familiar generic drug framework. 
 Part 0 of this Article focused on the new pathway to market and 
the resulting marketplace and claimed that, unlike the generic drug 
pathway and marketplace, the biosimilar pathway and marketplace 
are highly variable and likely to evolve. This Part turns to the regu-
latory incentives for innovative behavior: data exclusivity and regula-
tory enforcement of patents. 
                                                                                                                  
 175. See id. (noting that Momenta no longer believes interchangeability important, but 
Sandoz views it as “an absolute key for our uptake of our biosimilars”). 
 176. Section 351 of the PHSA can be traced to the Biologics Control Act of 1902. 
Carver, Elikan, & Lietzan, supra note 35, at 682-83. 
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A.   Data Exclusivity as Research Motivator 
 Data exclusivity refers to the period of time after approval of an 
innovative application before any abbreviated application, seeking to 
reply on the innovator’s research, may be submitted, or in some cases 
approved, by FDA.177 There is an immediately noticeable difference 
between the two schemes: the exclusivity term for biologics is longer 
than the exclusivity term for drugs. A biosimilar application may not 
be submitted until four years after, and approval of that application 
may not be effective until twelve years after, first licensure of the 
reference product.178 In contrast, a generic drug application may not 
be submitted until five years after approval of a new chemical entity 
(four years, if the generic company is challenging a patent held by 
the innovator), and in most cases where there is patent litigation, 
approval cannot be made effective until seven and a half years after 
approval of the new chemical entity.179 Although the longer data ex-
clusivity term for biologics has attracted a great deal of attention, the 
data exclusivity schemes differ in additional and more nuanced 
ways.180 
 First, the biologic framework does not provide separate exclusivity 
for post-approval innovation. Under the drug statute, if an innovator 
obtains approval of a new condition of use for its approved product—
such as a new indication, route of administration, or dosage form—
then an abbreviated application may not be approved for the same 
condition of use for three years.181 By way of contrast, if a biologic in-
novator obtains approval of its product for a new indication, route of 
administration, dosage form, or other condition of use, it may be able 
                                                                                                                  
 177. Data exclusivity is different from market exclusivity. During a data exclusivity 
term, a subsequent applicant may not rely on the innovator’s data; the abbreviated path-
way to market is not available. Data exclusivity does not prevent subsequent applicants 
from obtaining approval on the basis of their own research. By way of contrast, market 
exclusivity prevents approval of any applications, including applications containing full 
data packages. The primary example is orphan drug exclusivity, for drugs that treat rare 
diseases. During the seven-year orphan drug exclusivity period, FDA may not approve the 
same drug for the same disease, even if proposed in a full application supported by original 
research. 21 U.S.C. § 360cc(a) (2012). See Lietzan, supra note 9, at 110-11 (explaining the dif-
ference between data and market exclusivity). 
 178. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7) (2012). Professors Price and Rai have also argued that trade 
secrecy with respect to biologic manufacturing creates an additional barrier to entry that 
may “undermine” the “policy choice” that innovative biologics should have a “limited period 
of exclusivity.” See W. Nicholson Price II & Arti K. Rai, Manufacturing Barriers to Biolog-
ics Competition and Innovation, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1023, 1062 (2016). 
 179. 21 U.S.C. § 355 (j)(5)(F)(ii)-(iv) (2012).  
 180. See generally Lietzan, supra note 9 (presenting a more detailed and functional 
discussion of these differences). 
 181. 21 U.S.C. § 355 (j)(5)(F)(iv). This exclusivity is available as long as the innovator 
submitted clinical data (other than bioavailability data) essential to approval of the new 
condition of use. 
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to patent the innovation in question, but the statute does not pre-
clude approval of a biosimilar for that condition of use. Once the 
twelve years of exclusivity have expired, as a regulatory matter, sub-
sequent innovations introduced by the innovator may be copied im-
mediately. 
 Second, the biologic statute takes an all-or-nothing approach to 
structural innovations. If a drug innovator makes a structural modi-
fication to its previously approved active ingredient, and this results 
in a new active moiety, the new active moiety will be protected for 
five years. Any other structural modification will be protected for 
three years.182 Put another way, either five years or three years will 
be available. In contrast, a biologic innovator’s structural modifica-
tion to its previously licensed biological product either results in 
twelve years of exclusivity or has no consequence whatsoever. That 
is, a modification to the structure of a biologic that results in a 
change in safety, purity, or potency results in a new “reference prod-
uct,” to which new four-year and twelve-year data exclusivity terms 
apply.183 Anything short of that is treated like any other post-market 
innovation in the biologic framework; the innovator may be able to 
patent the innovation in question, but from a regulatory standpoint 
the innovation may be copied immediately. 
 Third, the statutes treat subsequent innovators differently, and 
this works synergistically with the differing approach to post-
approval innovation. Twelve-year exclusivity is available for every 
biologic innovator that obtains approval of an active ingredient, ra-
ther than (as in the drug framework) only the first company to obtain 
its approval.184 Thus, Teva received twelve years of exclusivity when 
FDA licensed Granix (tbo-filgrastim) in August 2012, despite the 
previous licensure of Amgen’s Neupogen (filgrastim).185 Had these 
products been subject to the drug statute, Teva would not have re-
ceived the same five years of exclusivity that the innovator received; 
it would have received three years. The differential treatment of sub-
sequent innovators is particularly important because the biologic 
statute: (1) does not give innovators any exclusivity for changes in-
troduced to their own products, and (2) does not permit biosimilar 
applicants to propose modifications to reference products. In the drug 
                                                                                                                  
 182. Id. § 355 (j)(5)(F)(iii).  
 183. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7)(A)-(C) (2012).  
 184. See generally Lietzan, supra note 9. 
 185. See FDA, LIST OF LICENSED BIOLOGICAL PRODUCTS WITH (1) REFERENCE PRODUCT 
EXCLUSIVITY AND (2) BIOSIMILARITY OR INTERCHANGEABILITY EVALUATIONS TO DATE (2017), 
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelo
pedandApproved/ApprovalApplications/TherapeuticBiologicApplications/Biosimilars/ 
UCM412398.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZN9R-Q9ZL]. 
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framework, a subsequent applicant seeking to market a modified 
version of an innovative product—perhaps a modified active ingredi-
ent—may file a 505(b)(2) application, relying on the innovator’s re-
search, and still receive three years of exclusivity.186 The innovator, if 
it makes those same changes, also receives three years of exclusivity. 
The two are on equal footing. In the biologic framework, a subse-
quent applicant seeking to market a modified version of an innova-
tive product must file a full application, either performing the pre-
clinical and clinical research itself (as Teva did) or paying for a right 
to reference the innovator’s research.187 But then it receives the full 
twelve years of exclusivity. By way of contrast, if the original innova-
tor makes those same changes, it receives no exclusivity, even if it files 
a separate application. The two companies are not on equal footing. 
 Exclusivity in the biologic framework is product by product (appli-
cation by application), rather than moiety by moiety.188 Dispensing 
with the novelty inquiry in this way may make sense in the biologic 
setting; novelty inquiries have sometimes been challenging for FDA 
in the drug setting and may be even more challenging in the biologic 
setting.189 The new approach is also consistent with understanding 
data exclusivity as an incentive for research and development behav-
ior (specifically, the generation of data), conceptually distinct from 
patents, which protect property rights in inventions and thereby en-
courage inventive activity as well as disclosure and description of the 
resulting discoveries. 
 The biologic scheme’s denial of exclusivity for an innovator’s own 
post-market research may reflect this understanding of exclusivity as 
a research motivator. With respect to new information (such as a new 
medical use) and new product features (such as a new route of ad-
ministration), the failure to provide exclusivity suggests a suspicion 
                                                                                                                  
 186. For instance, Sepracor earned three years of exclusivity in connection with its 
505(b)(2) application for Xopenex® (levalbuterol hydrochloride), which is intended for 
treatment or prevention of bronchospasm in adults and adolescents with reversible ob-
structive airway disease. Levalbuterol is the R-enantiomer of albuterol, and the Xopenex 
application relied on Schering-Plough’s approved NDA for Proventil® (albuterol). See Let-
ter from Sepracor to FDA (May 23, 1997), http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/ 
nda/99/20837_Xenopex_admindocs.pdf [https://perma.cc/K6U4-HKE8] (identifying refer-
ence product); FDA, ORANGE BOOK ADA31 (20th ed. 2000) ADFNA31 (confirming three-
year exclusivity). Even Omnitrope (somatropin recombinant), a follow-on version of Pfizer’s 
Genotropin (somatropin recombinant), received three-year exclusivity. FDA, ORANGE BOOK 
1013 (27th ed. 2007). 
 187. The competitor may obtain approval of its full application before the pioneer’s 
data exclusivity expires. Data exclusivity blocks approval of biosimilar applications, not 
full applications. Patent considerations may prevent this second innovator from marketing 
its product, but the regulatory scheme will not. See generally Lietzan, supra note 9. 
 188. See Lietzan, supra note 9. 
 189. Id. 
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that the research in question is not socially productive when per-
formed by the same company. Part 0 discusses this suspicion in more 
detail. With respect to structural modifications made by innovators, 
FDA has the opportunity to maintain the scheme’s focus on research 
motivation, but much will turn on how the agency applies the excep-
tion to twelve-year exclusivity. Under the statute, a company’s struc-
tural modifications to its own previously approved product do not re-
ceive exclusivity unless there is a resulting change in clinical profile. 
But the relationship between a biologic’s structural attributes and 
clinical performance may not be fully understood, and the mecha-
nisms of action may not be fully understood.190 Even if eventually un-
derstood, they may not be understood until after a substantial 
amount of money has been invested. In order to preserve the 
scheme’s focus on data exclusivity as a reward for research, FDA may 
need to presume a causal relationship if the structurally different 
molecule is demonstrated to be clinically different and causation is 
biologically plausible. 
 Regardless of how FDA interprets the provision relating to struc-
tural modifications, the biologic framework’s product-by-product ap-
proach, providing the same twelve-year term for any company that 
undertakes the laborious and expensive process of compiling a full 
application, rather than inquiring into the novelty of the underlying 
active moiety, suggests a revised understanding of the role of data 
exclusivity. This seems significant in light of recent scholarship con-
sidering whether patent protection and exclusivity are functionally 
duplicative or, instead, achieve different goals, as well as legislative 
proposals that would allow innovators to choose between them.191 
                                                                                                                  
 190. See supra Part I.  
 191. See Yaniv Heled, Why Primary Patents Covering Biologics Should be Unenforcea-
ble Against Generic Applicants Under the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act, 
21 ANNALS HEALTH L. 211, 221 (2012) (arguing that concurrent protection from primary 
patents and a 12-year exclusivity term “would cause waste and could lead to abuse of the 
patent system” but supporting “sequential” patent protection, for instance, for “secondary 
patents pertaining to substantial further developments of the originally approved biologi-
cal product”); Yaniv Heled, Patents vs. Statutory Exclusivities in Biological Pharmaceuti-
cals-Do We Really Need Both?, 18 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 419, 423-24 (2012) 
(arguing that the exclusivity afforded to biologics is superior to patent protection and 
should replace primary patent protections once FDA has approved the pioneer); Christo-
pher M. Holman, Maintaining Incentives for Healthcare Innovation: A Response to the 
FTC’s Report on Follow-On Biologics, 11 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 755, 756 (2010) (arguing 
in favor of a twelve-year data exclusivity period and a “fair and nondiscriminatory” pre-
approval patent dispute resolution process); Kristina M. Lybecker, When Patents Aren’t 
Enough: Why Biologics Necessitate Data Exclusivity Protection, 40 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 
1427 (2014) (arguing that the Trans Pacific Partnership trade agreement should require 
participating countries to adopt twelve years of data exclusivity for biologics, in part be-
cause of earlier economic work showing the break-even period for biologics to range from 
thirteen to sixteen years); Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of 
Patentability, 87 TEX. L. REV. 503, 569-70 (2009) (arguing for an extension in exclusivity in 
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B.   Quasi-Severance of Patents from the Regulatory Paradigm 
 Just as data exclusivity is conceptually separated from the patent 
incentive in the biologic framework, the relationship between the 
regulatory scheme and the innovator’s patent portfolio has been re-
worked. The biologic statute omits the regulatory reinforcement of 
patents that was the Hatch-Waxman legislation’s greatest innovation 
and that has been propagated in U.S. international trade agree-
ments. It also omits the regulatory incentives to achieving premarket 
resolution of patent disputes that have been the hallmark of the 
Hatch-Waxman scheme for more than thirty years. 
 1.   Lack of Regulatory Reinforcement 
 In the drug framework, the innovator’s patents assume a direct 
regulatory role; the drug statute reinforces those patents. Each new 
drug applicant must identify the patents that claim its drug or a 
method of using its drug and with respect to which a claim of patent 
infringement could reasonably be asserted if another person manu-
factured, used, or sold the drug, without license to do so.192 FDA lists 
the patents and their expiry dates in the Orange Book. Each generic 
applicant must address those patents in its application.193 In the case 
of an unexpired patent, the generic applicant has two choices: to note 
the date that the patent will expire, or to assert that the patent is 
invalid or will not be infringed by the applicant’s product. These are 
known as a “paragraph III” and “paragraph IV” certification, respec-
tively, after the provisions of the statute in which they appear.194 
 The innovator’s patents play a regulatory role, because the generic 
applicant’s selection of paragraph III versus paragraph IV dictates 
when FDA may approve its application. If the generic applicant in-
cludes a paragraph III certification, then even if the generic drug ap-
proval standards are satisfied, final approval of the generic drug may 
                                                                                                                  
order to capture unpatentable drugs); John A. Vernon et al., Exploration of Potential Eco-
nomics of Follow-On Biologics and Implications for Data Exclusivity Periods for Biologics, 
16 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 55, 56, 74 (2010) (arguing that the “considerable financial risk of 
biotechnology” research and development and its sensitivity to expected returns make it 
“critical” that Congress provide “a minimum of 17 years of data exclusivity or data protec-
tion” to ensure sufficient incentive for continued investment); see also Lietzan, supra note 
9, at 122-30 (discussing functional differences between patent protection and data exclusiv-
ity for medicines, noting some of the key scholarship on this issue, and describing the 
MODDERN Cures Act, which would allow companies to choose between exclusivity and 
patent protection). 
 192. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2012).  
 193. Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii). With respect to a patent claiming a method of using the ref-
erence drug, a generic applicant may instead decline to seek approval of the use in ques-
tion. Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(viii). 
 194. Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii) (III)-(IV). 
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not take effect until the patent expires.195 If, instead, the generic ap-
plicant includes a paragraph IV certification, challenging the patent, 
then approval of the generic drug may take effect immediately, un-
less the NDA holder or patent owner brings suit within forty-five 
days.196 If timely suit is brought, final approval of the generic applica-
tion is stayed for thirty months.197 At the end of the thirty months, 
FDA generally must approve the generic drug, even if the patent liti-
gation is ongoing.198 If a court finds the patent valid and infringed, it 
must order the effective date of final generic drug approval to be no 
sooner than patent expiry.199 It may separately enjoin the generic ap-
plicant from commercial manufacture, sale, and use of the product.200 
Finally, the drug statute separately states that FDA approval may 
not take effect until the date specified by the court.201 
 The biologic statute provides none of this. There is no link be-
tween the timing of biosimilar licensure and the existence of, or dis-
putes over, patents claiming the reference product. There is a scheme 
facilitating patent litigation prior to biosimilar market entry, but it is 
markedly different. The statute does not require biologic innovators 
to list their patents in their applications, nor does FDA publish a list 
of relevant patents. Instead, after the biosimilar application has been 
submitted, the two companies jointly and privately identify patents 
that may be at issue.202 The biosimilar applicant must provide a de-
tailed statement as to each patent either: (1) that it does not intend 
to market its product prior to patent expiry, or (2) why the patent is 
invalid, unenforceable, or not infringed.203 These correspond concep-
tually to a paragraph III certification and a paragraph IV certifica-
tion, respectively, in the drug statute, but they are provided to the 
innovator and not to FDA. Further, unlike the paragraph III certifi-
cation, the corresponding statement in the biologic statute does not 
preclude FDA approval of the biosimilar application. It is simply a 
                                                                                                                  
 195. Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(ii).  
 196. Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).  
 197. Id. 
 198. Specifically, assuming the approval standard has been met, FDA must approve the 
generic drug unless another generic applicant is eligible for 180-day exclusivity because it 
was the first to file a paragraph IV challenge to the innovator’s patent(s). See infra note 208. 
 199. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(4)(A) (2012).  
 200. Id. § 271(e)(4)(B). 
 201. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(II)(bb) (2012); see also id. § 314.107(b)(3)(B)(iii) 
(2016). In this case, FDA also requires the generic drug applicant to convert its paragraph 
IV certification to a paragraph III certification. Id. § 314.94(a)(12)(viii)(A). Once the para-
graph III certification is in place, approval of the generic drug may not take effect until the 
patent expires. Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(ii). 
 202. 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(2)-(6) (2012). 
 203. Id. § 262(l)(3)(B)(ii)(I)-(II).  
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privately communicated statement of intent not to market prior to 
patent expiry. Nor is there a stay of FDA approval of the biosimilar 
in the event of timely suit on a patent claiming the reference product. 
Instead, after the companies select from the master list of patents a 
subset of patents for immediate litigation, the innovator faces penal-
ties (discussed in the next subsection) if it fails to bring suit within 
thirty days.204 There are no regulatory benefits to filing suit.205 More-
over, unlike a prevailing drug patent owner, a prevailing biologic pa-
tent owner is not entitled to a court order setting the biosimilar ap-
proval date as the date of patent expiry. It is entitled to a statutory 
injunction of infringement, but only if it wins the case before data 
exclusivity expires.206 
 Thus, unlike the drug statute, the biologic statute does not rein-
force the innovator’s patents. If a biosimilar applicant declines to 
challenge a listed patent and chooses instead to delay market entry 
until the patent expires, it provides the innovator a statement to that 
effect—but FDA may license the biosimilar. If a biosimilar applicant 
asserts that a listed patent is invalid or not infringed, the innovator 
might institute patent infringement litigation—but FDA may license 
the biosimilar. If a court finds a listed patent valid and infringed, it 
might enjoin the biosimilar applicant from market entry—but the 
statute does not require the court to direct FDA not to license the bi-
osimilar. The timing of licensure of a biosimilar will turn on regula-
tory considerations, such as the timing of the submission (itself in-
formed by data exclusivity and presumably the applicant’s assess-
ment of the innovator’s patent portfolio) and the quality of the sub-
mission. 
 2.   Omission of Regulatory Incentives to Resolve Patent Issues 
 The biologic statute also omits any regulatory incentives to resolve 
patent issues prior to biosimilar approval and launch. This stands in 
stark contrast to the drug statute, which includes provisions de-
                                                                                                                  
 204. If the parties do not reach an agreement, the statute creates a procedure for de-
termining which patents will be litigated immediately. Id. § 262(l)(5). 
 205. The statutes specify one role for FDA in the patent litigation scheme. Within thir-
ty days of service of a complaint for patent infringement, the biosimilar applicant must 
provide FDA with notice and a copy of the complaint. FDA, in turn, must publish notice of 
that complaint in the Federal Register. Id. § 262(l)(6)(C). The statute imposes no deadline 
for publication of this notice, and they have been running several months behind. E.g., 
Receipt of Notice That a Patent Infringement Complaint Was Filed Against a Biosimilar 
Applicant, 81 Fed. Reg. 18,858 (Apr. 1, 2016) (notice of October 2, 2015, complaint). 
 206. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(4)(A) (2012) (requiring court to order that generic 
drug approval be postponed to patent expiry), with id. § 271 (e)(4)(D) (requiring injunction 
of infringement by biosimilar applicant provided the biosimilar applicant has not yet been 
approved, due to data exclusivity). 
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signed to incentivize both innovators and generic applicants to partic-
ipate in premarket patent litigation. The drug statute encourages 
patent challenges by permitting a generic applicant that challenges a 
patent claiming a new chemical entity, or a method of using the new 
chemical entity, to submit its application four years—rather than five 
years—after FDA approval of the innovative product in question.207 It 
further encourages patent challenges by providing that, regardless of 
whether the innovative product was a new chemical entity, the first 
generic applicant to include a patent challenge in its ANDA is eligible 
for 180 days of exclusivity against subsequent generic challengers.208 
Finally, the drug statute encourages innovators to bring patent liti-
gation promptly, by offering a thirty-month stay of generic approval 
if suit is brought within forty-five days of notice of a patent chal-
lenge.209 
 The biologic framework takes a fundamentally different approach. 
Where the drug scheme dangles carrots, the biologic scheme threat-
ens with a stick. To begin with, a biosimilar applicant that challenges 
an innovator’s patent will receive no regulatory benefits. It may not 
submit its application any earlier, nor does the first to challenge the 
patent become eligible for exclusivity. Also, an innovator that initi-
ates premarket litigation within the thirty-day window receives no 
regulatory benefits; there is no stay of biosimilar approval. Instead, 
the innovator and patent owner face penalties for their failure to fol-
low the premarket patent litigation process laid out in the statute. 
Specifically, if the innovator does not initiate patent litigation within 
the window, or does but the suit is dismissed without prejudice or not 
prosecuted in good faith, it may recover only a reasonable royalty for 
infringement of the patent.210 Moreover, if the patent should have 
been, but was not, included on the innovator’s initial list of patents, 
the patent owner may not bring suit on that patent under section 271 
of the Patent Act with respect to that biosimilar product.211 
                                                                                                                  
 207. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(F)(ii) (2012). 
 208. Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv). See generally Erika Lietzan & Julia Post, The Law of 180-
Day Exclusivity, 71 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 327 (2016).  
 209. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B)(ii), (iii), (iv) (2012). If the reference product is a new chem-
ical entity and the litigation begins during the fifth year after its approval, the stay is 
lengthened to toll generic approval until seven and a half years after new chemical entity 
approval. Id. § 355(j)(5)(F)(ii).  
 210. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(6)(A), (B) (2012). 
 211. Id. § 271(e)(6)(C). If a patent issues to, or is exclusively licensed by, the innovator 
after the initial list has been generated, the innovator has thirty days to supplement its 
list. 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(7) (2012). The same penalty provision then applies. If the patent 
should have been listed and was not, the patent owner may not bring suit on that patent 
with respect to that biosimilar product. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(6)(C) (2012). It has been sug-
gested that the penalty provision simply precludes patent infringement litigation under 
subsection 271(e)(2) rather than all of section 271 of the Patent Act. Brian D. Coggio, Can 
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 The consequences for a biosimilar applicant that fails to follow the 
process are much less significant. The statute describes consequences 
that stop short of penalty. If the biosimilar applicant fails to provide 
a copy of its application to the innovator, the innovator may bring a 
declaratory judgment action on certain patents, assuming it is aware 
of the biosimilar application, but the biosimilar applicant may not 
bring a declaratory judgment action.212 The biosimilar applicant faces 
a similar consequence if it provides its application but fails to take 
any of the subsequent steps in the process, such as asserting a posi-
tion on each listed patent. That is, the innovator may bring a declar-
atory judgment action, but the biosimilar applicant may not.213 The 
innovator cannot obtain a federal injunction ordering the biosimilar 
application to provide its application, and presumably it cannot ob-
tain an injunction ordering the biosimilar application to comply with 
any of the subsequent steps.214 In the end, meaningful adverse conse-
quences for the biosimilar applicant will derive from a court finding 
of infringement, not from its refusal to participate in the premarket 
patent process. 
V.   IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
 The goals of the 2010 biosimilar biologic statute were essentially 
the same as the goals of the 1984 generic drug statute: to enable cost-
                                                                                                                  
Reference Sponsor Forfeit Right to Sue Under BPCIA?, LAW 360 (July 25, 2016, 12:51 PM), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/820197/can-reference-sponsor-forfeit-right-to-sue-under-
bpcia. This would preclude premarket patent litigation, for which federal court jurisdiction 
is made possible by an artificial act of infringement tied to the patent challenge. The ar-
gument requires a strained reading of the term “section” in the penalty provision, but if 
correct would mean that the innovator and patent owner could still bring suit once the 
biosimilar applicant launched.  
 212. 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(9)(C) (2012). The PHSA authorizes an action for declaratory 
judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 2201 in this case, but only with respect to a patent claiming 
the reference product or a method of using the reference product.  The Patent Act deems 
submission of the biosimilar application an artificial act of infringement with respect to a 
broader group of patents—any patent that could have been identified if the biosimilar ap-
plicant had provided its application. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(C)(ii) (2012). 
 213. Id. § 262(l)(9)(B). In this case the PHSA authorizes a declaratory judgment with 
respect to any patent identified by the reference product sponsor in the first step of the 
information exchange process. 
 214. Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1664, 1675 (2017) (holding that reference 
product sponsors do not have access to injunctive relief, at least as a matter of federal law, 
to enforce the disclosure requirement). Although the reference product sponsor cannot en-
force the requirement to provide a copy of the biosimilar application in federal court, it 
remains to be seen whether remedies might be available under state law. Id. It is also at 
least theoretically possible that the federal government will decide to enforce the require-
ment. E.g., id. n.2 (referring to a “violation” of the requirement in § 262(l)(2)(A) to provide a 
copy of the application); 42 U.S.C. § 262(f) (deeming it a misdemeanor to “violate” any pro-
vision of section 262); see also Sandoz, 137 S. Ct. at 1678 (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting 
that Congress had implicitly delegated authority to interpret these provisions to FDA). 
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savings for the healthcare finance system by facilitating approval of 
lower priced versions of higher priced innovative medicines, while 
stimulating innovation, or at least preserving incentives to innovate. 
Both statutes require a delicate balance of static and dynamic wel-
fare considerations: the desire for less expensive versions of already 
available innovative products, on the one hand, and the desire for 
improved innovative products and new cures, including cures for un-
treated or poorly treated conditions, on the other hand. The approach 
taken in 2010 for biological medicines is, however, profoundly differ-
ent from the approach taken in 1984 for conventional drugs. 
 Part 0 of this Article describes a framework for approval, promo-
tion, pricing, reimbursement, and uptake of biosimilar biologics that 
is complex, variable, evolving, and unlike anything that scholars and 
courts have seen previously. Part 0 describes a refined view of data 
exclusivity as an incentive for research rather than invention, as well 
as a disentanglement of patents from the regulatory approval stat-
ute. Together Parts 0 and 0 suggest that with respect to both compe-
tition and innovation, we are now in uncharted waters. The new par-
adigm invites important theoretical and empirical work on innova-
tion and competition in biologic medicines in the years ahead. This 
Part concludes with some speculation about how these differences 
may work synergistically and why they may matter. 
 To begin with, there may be cause for concern that the new biolog-
ic framework provides insufficient incentive for post-approval innova-
tion by biologic innovators, meaning the development of new infor-
mation and the development of new products. An innovator receives 
no supplemental exclusivity for new indications or other new labeling 
information, even if supported by extensive and expensive research. 
The information in question—whether developed after five years, ten 
years, or fifteen years—will be protected only until twelve years after 
the product was first licensed. This may be concerning because recent 
developments in patent law could undermine the incentive to discov-
er new information.215 The value of patent protection may be modest 
here in any case, because the patent is not enforced by the biologic 
regulatory scheme, and because healthcare providers and patients 
use approved products in ways that deviate from the approved label-
ing and that infringe patents. 
 There may also be insufficient incentive for innovators to develop 
new product features, such as new formulations, routes of admin-
                                                                                                                  
 215. E.g., Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 566 U.S. 66 (2012) (invalidat-
ing a claim for a method of optimizing therapeutic efficacy for treatment of an immune-
mediated gastrointestinal disorder with thiopurine, which relied on the previously unknown 
correlations between metabolite levels and likely harm or ineffectiveness).  
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istration, and dosage forms. Like new information, new product fea-
tures receive no supplemental exclusivity. As a regulatory matter, 
they will be protected only until the originally approved product is 
vulnerable to biosimilars—twelve years after first licensure. The in-
novator’s ability to recoup its investment in new product features will 
depend on the features having both clinical significance and strong 
patent protection. Clinical significance may not be evident until after 
significant investments have been made, which may mean that in-
vestments will simply not be made. And strong patent protection may 
not align with clinical benefit in the case of a medicine, as the inquir-
ies are different.216 
 The net result could be loss of important innovation with respect 
to already marketed biologics. Although it may be difficult to quanti-
fy or characterize the research that is foresworn in the new biologic 
framework, the dramatically different approach to post-market re-
search and product innovation surely calls for close attention to the 
possibility of a decline. 
 As a historical matter, the biologic statute’s uncharitable ap-
proach to post-market innovation by pioneers may stem from con-
cerns about supposedly anti-competitive innovation in the drug mar-
ketplace, called “product hopping” by its detractors. A closer look, 
however, illustrates the problem with simply borrowing assumptions 
from the generic drug literature. The essence of the argument in the 
drug setting is that it is exclusionary for an innovator to introduce a 
patented (or exclusivity-protected) second generation version of its 
product shortly before the patents or exclusivity on the first genera-
tion version expire, particularly if the end result is that physicians 
and patients switch to its newer product rather than using the gener-
ic version of its first generation product.217 Sometimes the innovator’s 
advertising and promotion persuades physicians and patients to 
adopt the newer product, and detractors voice suspicion that these 
individuals switched to the more expensive product even when 
switching was not medically indicated. In other cases, it is argued, 
market withdrawal of the first-generation product forces patients to 
                                                                                                                  
 216. See Lietzan, supra note 9, at 125-26. 
 217. See, e.g., Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust Law and Regulatory Gam-
ing, 87 TEX. L. REV. 685, 687 (2009) (referring to “product hopping”—where “the branded 
company makes repeated changes in a drug’s formulation to prevent generic substitution, 
rather than to improve the efficacy of the drug product”—as an “exclusionary tactic”); Aa-
ron S. Kesselheim & Jonathan J. Darrow, Hatch-Waxman Turns 30: Do We Need a Re-
Designed Approach for the Modern Era?, 15 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 293, 336-40 
(2015) (describing “strategic introduction of a slightly modified form of the product just 
prior to patent expiration,” suggesting that “timing” is an important clue as to the compa-
ny’s purpose, and suggesting that statutory changes might be appropriate if “a clear pat-
tern of abuse” goes uncorrected in the courts). 
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switch to the newer product, and inertia prevents them from switch-
ing back once a generic is approved. Ultimately, the concern is that 
generic copies of the first-generation product will not achieve market 
penetration, because the business model of generic companies in-
volves reliance on automatic substitution, and physicians will no 
longer write prescriptions for the innovator’s first-generation prod-
uct. The lack of generic market penetration, the argument goes, de-
prives the healthcare finance system of the substantial cost-savings 
that were expected when the innovator’s first product reached patent 
and exclusivity expiry. Lawsuits challenging these post-market inno-
vation and marketing decisions on antitrust grounds have been wind-
ing their way through the federal courts for more than a decade, with 
mixed results.218 
 A different and more complex analysis may be necessary in the 
biologic framework, at least in the short term and at least with re-
spect to biosimilar biologics. Biosimilar applicants will likely obtain 
market share by persuading formulary committees, healthcare pro-
viders, and pharmacy benefit managers to select their products over 
the corresponding reference products. Their ability to do so may de-
pend on the cost savings they are able to offer, which in turn may de-
pend on the premarket burden they face, and this could depend in 
turn on FDA’s interpretation and implementation of the new path-
way (which could evolve) as well as issues specific to the product 
class or product at issue. Their ability to persuade these deci-
                                                                                                                  
 218. Compare New York v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638 (2d Cir. 2015) (ruling that an 
innovator could not stop selling its immediate release formulation of a particular drug—in 
favor of a newer, patented, extended release formulation—until thirty days after approval 
of the first generic versions of the immediate release product), with Mylan Pharms. v. 
Warner Chilcott, 838 F.3d 421 (3d Cir. 2016) (affirming summary judgment in case involv-
ing three reformulations of Doryx® (doxycycline hyclate) combined with ceasing sales of, 
and buying back, prior formulations, and promotion of the new formulations). The district 
court in Pennsylvania concluded that a generic company may reach consumers through 
advertising, promotion, cost competition, or superior product development, and that if it 
chooses instead to rely on automatic state substitution laws, it is a “victim” of its own busi-
ness strategy. Mylan Pharms. v. Warner Chilcott, Civ. No. 12-3824, 2015 WL 1736957 
(E.D. Pa. 2015). The Court of Appeals quoted, approvingly, the district court’s comment 
that Warner Chilcott had “no duty to facilitate Mylan’s business plan by keeping older 
versions of branded Doryx on the market.” Mylan Pharms., 838 F.3d at 432. Outcomes at 
the district court level have varied somewhat with the facts. See In re Suboxone (Bupren-
orphine Hydrochloride & Naloxone) Antitrust Litig., 64 F. Supp. 3d 665 (E.D. Pa. 2014) 
(denying motion to dismiss in case involving introduction of Suboxone® film and potential 
removal of Suboxone® tablets due to safety concerns); Walgreen Co. v. AstraZeneca 
Pharms. L.P., 534 F. Supp. 2d 146 (D.D.C. 2008) (granting motion to dismiss Sherman Act 
complaint relating to introduction, and promotion, of Nexium® (esomeprazole) eight 
months before expiry of patents on Prilosec® (omeprazole)); Abbott Labs. v. Teva Pharms. 
USA, 432 F. Supp. 2d 408 (D. Del. 2006) (denying motion to dismiss in case involving two 
formulation changes to Tricor® (fenofibrate), one from capsules to tablets and the other 
from one tablet to another, and efforts to remove capsules from the marketplace). 
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sionmakers could also turn, for now, on other factors, such as the 
immunogenicity profile of the molecule and the number of newly di-
agnosed (treatment-naïve) patients each year, or brand loyalty on the 
part of healthcare providers (which may vary). Further, because bio-
similar applicants seem inclined to provide only modest discounts in 
the immediate term, and because biosimilar market share will de-
pend on competition rather than automatic substitution, many expect 
innovators to continue marketing their first-generation products af-
ter biosimilar market entry. This suggests that the development, pa-
tenting, and introduction of a second-generation innovative product 
may simply give decisionmakers a third product in the class from 
which to select. Whether or not the innovator continues to market its 
original product, the presence of a second-generation innovative 
product in the marketplace will not preclude biosimilar applicants 
from employing the primary mechanism by which they obtain market 
share: promotion, presumably mostly on the basis of cost-savings, to 
payers. Further, it is not unreasonable to hypothesize that rational 
payers will push physicians and patients to biosimilars of the first-
generation product unless the second-generation product is not only 
clinically superior but also comparatively cost-effective. 
 Closely connected to incentives for post-approval innovation and 
the question of product hopping are the incentives for subsequent 
applicants themselves, specifically the pathway choices they face. 
Here it may be highly relevant that in the biologic framework, the 
classic industry bifurcation—innovators on the one hand and generic 
companies on the other hand—has evaporated. To give a concrete 
example, Amgen holds the approved application for the first refer-
ence product to be cited (Neupogen) as well as the approved applica-
tion for the fourth biosimilar to be approved (Amjevita, a biosimilar 
of Humira). The significant investment needed to develop, manufac-
ture, and market a biosimilar has so far limited the field to larger 
firms, mainly innovators with biologic expertise. Any such applicant 
considering its own version of a previously approved biological prod-
uct necessarily faces a choice whether to use the biosimilar pathway 
or instead file a full application. The choice is complex.219 On the one 
hand, the biosimilar pathway is less expensive than the full pathway, 
and a biosimilar applicant may use the highly advantageous process 
of extrapolation to justify a broad approval for patient populations 
and indications that it has not clinically tested.220 Further, an inter-
changeability determination is a possibility. On the other hand, with 
the biosimilar pathway there is no scope to make improvements or 
                                                                                                                  
 219. Lietzan, supra note 9, at 162. 
 220. See HEALTH CANADA, supra note 71. 
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modifications to the molecule, or to propose new uses, nor is it possi-
ble to deviate with respect to route of administration, dosage form, or 
strength in order to avoid a patent. The strict-duplication rule could 
stimulate price competition among a reference product and its bio-
similars, but the innovative firms are not accustomed to competing in 
this manner without any basis for product differentiation. 
 The differences in the biosimilar framework suggest that the 
“product hopping” cases and literature from the drug framework may 
not be relevant. If true, then reliance on this history to justify a 
cramped approach to post-approval innovation in the biologic statute 
was misplaced. Arguably this makes it even more imperative to 
watch closely for the possibility that the scheme’s failure to reward 
post-market innovation causes harm in the form of innovation not 
undertaken. The “product hopping” discussion also suggests that 
what is viewed as anticompetitive in one framework may not have 
the same practical impact, in the other. Consequently, scholars and 
courts would do well to consider the myriad differences in the biologic 
framework before assuming the relevance of analysis and empirical 
scholarship from the drug scholarship. This is not to say that choices 
criticized in the drug framework will not emerge, or merit concern, in 
the biologic framework. The claim is only that these waters are dif-
ferent and deeper, and robust scholarship should take stock of those 
differences. Moreover, the variability and dynamism of the biologic 
framework mean that scholars and courts will need to engage in iter-
ative assessments. What is true of one biologic may not be true of an-
other biologic. What is true in one year might not be true three years 
later. 
 Over time, the evolution in the framework may create an oppor-
tunity for new scholarship comparing the different approaches to in-
novation. The dynamism could mean that eventually significant por-
tions of the biologic framework come to resemble the corresponding 
aspects of the drug framework. Without any change in the legisla-
tion, in another decade or two, FDA could be approving mostly inter-
changeable biologics (rather than biosimilar biologics) and mostly on 
the basis of (generic-like) analytical and pharmacokinetic applica-
tions. Working in conjunction with state pharmacy law, distribution 
models and reimbursement policies could evolve to ensure automatic 
use of interchangeable biologics in this scenario. In this hypothetical 
evolved world, the primary remaining difference between the drug 
framework and biologic frameworks might be the profound difference 
in innovation policies discussed in Part 0. This could set up a natural 
experiment, allowing comparison of the two approaches and possibly 
leading us to better data-driven conclusions about the approach that 
best furthers social welfare. 
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